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The Litvinenko Inquiry

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Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander <strong>Litvinenko</strong>’s final months<br />

that it had been responsible for the explosion in Ingushetia that had killed Shamil<br />

Basayev, a leading Chechen terrorist.<br />

5.24 Against this backdrop, Professor Service expressed the view that the 2006 amendment<br />

to the anti-extremist law had an influence going beyond the scope of its black letter<br />

provisions. In his report he put the matter in this way:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> amendment did, however, have a political consequence of importance<br />

by broadening the spectrum of targets to be pursued by the security agencies.<br />

Not only out-and-out terrorists were mentioned but ‘extremists’ in general, and<br />

extremism itself was described only in relation to imprecisely delineated categories<br />

of activity. <strong>The</strong> door was left open to brand a large swathe of opponents of Putin<br />

and his administration as extremists who needed to be eliminated. And terrorism<br />

and extremism were frequently mentioned in the same breath by Putin and his<br />

ministers. <strong>The</strong>re was little attempt to make an official distinction between the two<br />

phenomena that the legislation was directed against. To that extent, there was an<br />

implicit licensing package for FSB operations abroad as well as in Russia.” 12<br />

5.25 Professor Service expanded on this reasoning in giving oral evidence. When asked<br />

whether it was his view that the 2006 laws had more of a political than a legal effect,<br />

he stated:<br />

“Yes, I think that’s a fair summary. In legal terms, only one of them related to<br />

legal encouragement for taking physical action abroad, but generally taking the<br />

two together, the political effect was to engender an environment within the FSB<br />

and within public opinion that there was little difference between acting against<br />

extremism and acting against terrorism… legally speaking, there is a distinction, but<br />

it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the authorities wanted to fudge that distinction<br />

and just create a new feeling for the FSB to feel free to act without constraint.” 13<br />

He continued:<br />

“We don’t have definite documentation about exactly why President Putin introduced<br />

these two legal changes in 2006, but we do know that they were introduced to the<br />

maximum of publicity, so that it is inconceivable that they were not thought to be<br />

important elements in reinforcing support in public opinion for what the authorities<br />

wanted to do.” 14<br />

And further:<br />

“We simply don’t know the extent to which those two amendments affected the<br />

operational activity of the FSB. It seems a strong possibility that those amendments<br />

opened a channel for the FSB that wasn’t as wide beforehand.” 15<br />

12<br />

INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 69)<br />

13<br />

Service 28/47 lines 4-14<br />

14<br />

Service 28/48 lines 3-9<br />

15<br />

Service 28/51 lines 2-6<br />

91

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