GLOBAL FORECAST

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faith on effective measures relating to the cessation clear weapons reductions, and a Republican president might be able to secure real reductions in trea- of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete ties more easily than a Democrat. Every U.S. president disarmament under strict and effective international since Nixon has made unilateral reductions to the control.” It is far better to direct a process to develop nuclear weapons stockpile, with the largest of those effective measures than only react to what could be made by Republican presidents. 2 unreasonable or impractical demands from outside. 4. The world has changed, but nuclear weapons 2. The nuclear disarmament “movement” is in the haven’t. Seventy years after their invention, nuclear game for the long run. The first nuclear disarmament weapons are still regarded as indispensable and prestigious by some, and atavistic and dangerous by others. campaigns began after World War II and they have ebbed and flowed with politics and crises. At a global They are still the currency of power, despite the fact No longer can we compartmentalize nuclear risks—where there are weapons, fissile material, or facilities, there will be threats and risks. that influence can be wielded across borders in so many other ways today. Their imperviousness to change stands in marked contrast to, for example, information technology and nanotechnology. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent and connected, the isolation these weapons require (for safety, security, and surety reasons) will become an increasingly difficult burden. stockpile of over 15,000 nuclear weapons today, we are closer to zero than we were at the height of the Cold War (70,000 nuclear weapons in 1986), but still very far away. Although some advocates of disarmament have called for “timebound” frameworks or conventions to ban nuclear weapons with a pen-stroke, few believe disarmament is quick or easy. Part of the challenge will be to acclimatize keepers of arsenals to lower and lower numbers. Fundamentally, the wider support for deep nuclear This has already happened over the last 30 years in cuts and for measurable progress toward disarmament is rooted in the recognition that the world has the United States and Russia, as the comfort zone for levels of deployed weapons slowly has dropped from changed. No longer can we compartmentalize nuclear risks—where there are weapons, fissile materi- 10,000 to 3,000 to 1,000 nuclear weapons. 3. The long-term trend is “less is more.” Russian and al, or facilities, there will be threats and risks. When U.S. nuclear forces are magnitudes larger than those President Obama called in 2009 in Prague for durable of any other country (both have between 7,000 and institutions to counter this “lasting threat,” he wasn’t 8,000 total deployed, nondeployed, and retired warheads). Although Russia is modernizing its forces, they readily responded to the call. As nuclear risks referring to the nuclear disarmament movement, but numbers are unlikely to go up. The end of the Obama rise, their nuclear messaging may become more, presidency does not necessarily mean the end of nu- rather than less, attractive. 2 Hans Kristensen, “How Presidents Arm and Disarm,” October 15, 2014, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/10/stockpilereductions/. 98 | Center for Strategic and International Studies
Missile Defense and Deterrence THOMAS KARAKO IN THE 1980S, COMMENTATORS PREDICTED THAT CONVENTIONAL PRECISION-STRIKE SYSTEMS WOULD BECOME CAPABLE OF STRATEGIC EFFECTS THAT FORMERLY ONLY NU- CLEAR WEAPONS COULD DO. Despite efforts to curtail their proliferation, the spread of delivery system technologies has instead produced a kind of “missile renaissance.” Recent technological, commercial, and geopolitical trends have contributed to a surge in the global supply and demand for unmanned, high-precision, and high-velocity delivery systems—and the means to defend against them. Global Forecast 2016 | 99
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2016 GLOBAL FORECAST editors CRAIG
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about csis For over 50 years, the C
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Introduction CRAIG COHEN WASHINGTON
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6 | Center for Strategic and Intern
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Reconnecting of Asia JOHN J. HAMRE
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10 | Center for Strategic and Inter
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America’s Changing Role in the Wo
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A selective engagement approach to
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tional, military, and economic mean
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ole in international affairs. Now w
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ISIS (Re)Writes History JON B. ALTE
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enth-century society of pious belie
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and daily exhibitions of terror and
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Iran after the Agreement ANTHONY H.
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understanding that the United State
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Israeli military leaders predict th
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Putin’s Europe HEATHER A. CONLEY
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far-right, anti-Semitic Jobbik part
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Predicting Russian behavior is hard
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A NATO Strategy for the Eastern Fla
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Sino-Russian Cooperation JEFFREY MA
Page 50 and 51: Interbank Financial Transaction) sy
Page 52 and 53: 50 | Center for Strategic and Inter
Page 54 and 55: Reform Cold, Politics Hot: Presiden
Page 56 and 57: pushing ahead more aggressively on
Page 58 and 59: not just hypothetical; they are alr
Page 60 and 61: Geopolitical Consequences of China
Page 62 and 63: Chinese leaders are actively pursui
Page 66 and 67: By 2030, the Asia-Pacific region wi
Page 68 and 69: is not expected to be a major playe
Page 70 and 71: North Korean Vulnerability? VICTOR
Page 72 and 73: downturn in the country’s stock e
Page 75 and 76: PART 6 africa
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Page 79 and 80: Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa THO
Page 81 and 82: states, sustaining itself through k
Page 83 and 84: PART 7 inside the pentagon Global F
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Page 87 and 88: The Battle over How to Save Defense
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Page 94 and 95: What is one of the most significant
Page 96 and 97: Nuclear Deterrence in a Disordered
Page 98 and 99: The Need for Global Zero SHARON SQU
Page 102 and 103: Increased interest in missile-based
Page 104 and 105: state and substate actors has becom
Page 107 and 108: PART 9 energy and security
Page 109 and 110: Implications of Sustained Low Oil P
Page 111 and 112: e used to partially offset this “
Page 113 and 114: Linking Subnational and Supranation
Page 115 and 116: Efficacy of Sanctions against Energ
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Page 120 and 121: Responding to the Closing of Democr
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Page 124 and 125: Soft Power and Security DANIEL RUND
Page 126 and 127: After the Ebola Catastrophe J. STEP
Page 128 and 129: sense of—and account for—the wi
Page 130 and 131: Food Insecurity, Conflict, and Stab
Page 132 and 133: Despite its impressive economic gro
Page 134 and 135: prisoners in a gesture of good fait
Page 136 and 137: Winning the War of Ideas FARAH PAND
Page 138 and 139: versity of religious belief, includ
Page 140 and 141: contributors JON B. ALTERMAN is a s
Page 142 and 143: MICHAEL J. GREEN is senior vice pre
Page 144 and 145: FARAH PANDITH is a senior fellow at
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GLOBAL FORECAST

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