GLOBAL FORECAST

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Nuclear Deterrence in a Disordered World REBECCA K.C. HERSMAN WHOEVER TAKES OFFICE IN JANUARY 2017 IS LIKELY TO INHERIT A NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE OF GREATER RISK, COMPLEXITY, AND CHALLENGE THAN ANY TIME SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. In the roiling Middle East, Iran’s nuclear weapons capability may be delayed, but its malign influence continues to spread as it takes clever advantage of the surrounding chaos in Iraq, the Levant, and Yemen. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel remain concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, raising the stakes for proliferation and extended deterrence in the region. In Asia, North Korea’s continued expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal and associated delivery platforms combined with Kim Jong-un’s penchant for provocation and bravado, raises the risk of nuclear coercion, and undermines confidence in current deterrence approaches. Meanwhile, nuclear competition be- 94 | Center for Strategic and International Studies
tween Pakistan and India continues to grow, spurred on by Pakistan’s now-open acknowledgement of a range of “tactical” nuclear weapons as part of their “full spectrum deterrence.” And China, unabashed in its desire to assert greater regional dominance, is modernizing its nuclear fleet, diversifying and hardening its nuclear arsenal, and rapidly enhancing complementary capabilities in space, cyber, and advanced missile systems. Finally, Russia is demanding an expanded sphere of influence—rejecting further arms control efforts, embracing and modernizing its nuclear weapons program, and expanding territorial claims. Russia’s highly provocative “signaling” of its nuclear capabilities to nonnuclear weapons states on its periphery coupled with proxy-warfighting in Ukraine have brought the nuclear policy and deterrence underpinnings of the NATO alliance to the fore in ways not seen since in more than 20 years. Nuclear weapons require a U.S. nuclear force and posture that is not only safe, secure, and effective but also credible, demonstrable, and sustainable. Iran’s economic and conventional military powers expand. In an increasingly nuclearized Asia, the United States must reinforce confidence in extended deterrence while countering nuclear competition and any related lowering of the nuclear-use threshold. And in Europe, this balancing act requires a reinvigoration of NATO deterrence and defense posture while deescalating the nascent Russian nuclear brinkmanship currently underway. At home, Congress and the executive branch must work together to ensure a healthy and sustainable nuclear enterprise despite extraordinary budgetary pressures, a highly politicized policy climate, and an international community skeptical about U.S. motives and intentions. That balancing act requires a coherent and compelling strategy for the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security that has so far proven elusive. A strategy that preserves stability without provocation, builds confidence rather than prompting fear, and preserves the highest possible threshold for nuclear use while encouraging all The picture at home is daunting as well. Following a series of scandals and missteps, the U.S. nuclear enterprise again came under scathing criticism in 2014, other nuclear weapons possessors to do likewise. A strategy that acknowledges the United States as prompting reviews that pointed to a demoralized operational climate, demotivating personnel practices, the global champion of nuclear nonproliferation and the fundamental guarantor of security against insufficient leadership and oversight, and persistent nuclear intimidation, coercion, or use. This role requires a nuclear force and posture that is not only budget crises as eroding the health and sustainability of the nation’s nuclear enterprise writ large. safe, secure, and effective but also credible, demonstrable, and sustainable. And it will require Ameri- The path to reducing and managing these risks will involve a delicate balancing of interests and players. can leadership—at home, with allies, and in the face In the Middle East, the challenge will be to suppress of potential adversaries—for whom the disordered the nuclear appetites of state and nonstate actors as world ahead may be a very scary place. instability and conflict grow across the region and Global Forecast 2016 | 95
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2016 GLOBAL FORECAST editors CRAIG
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about csis For over 50 years, the C
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Introduction CRAIG COHEN WASHINGTON
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6 | Center for Strategic and Intern
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Reconnecting of Asia JOHN J. HAMRE
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10 | Center for Strategic and Inter
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America’s Changing Role in the Wo
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A selective engagement approach to
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tional, military, and economic mean
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ole in international affairs. Now w
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ISIS (Re)Writes History JON B. ALTE
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enth-century society of pious belie
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and daily exhibitions of terror and
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Iran after the Agreement ANTHONY H.
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understanding that the United State
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Israeli military leaders predict th
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Putin’s Europe HEATHER A. CONLEY
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far-right, anti-Semitic Jobbik part
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Predicting Russian behavior is hard
Page 46 and 47: A NATO Strategy for the Eastern Fla
Page 48 and 49: Sino-Russian Cooperation JEFFREY MA
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Page 54 and 55: Reform Cold, Politics Hot: Presiden
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Page 58 and 59: not just hypothetical; they are alr
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Page 62 and 63: Chinese leaders are actively pursui
Page 66 and 67: By 2030, the Asia-Pacific region wi
Page 68 and 69: is not expected to be a major playe
Page 70 and 71: North Korean Vulnerability? VICTOR
Page 72 and 73: downturn in the country’s stock e
Page 75 and 76: PART 6 africa
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Page 79 and 80: Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa THO
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Page 83 and 84: PART 7 inside the pentagon Global F
Page 85 and 86: Three Fiscal Futures In the final w
Page 87 and 88: The Battle over How to Save Defense
Page 89: apid acquisition actually happened
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Page 98 and 99: The Need for Global Zero SHARON SQU
Page 100 and 101: faith on effective measures relatin
Page 102 and 103: Increased interest in missile-based
Page 104 and 105: state and substate actors has becom
Page 107 and 108: PART 9 energy and security
Page 109 and 110: Implications of Sustained Low Oil P
Page 111 and 112: e used to partially offset this “
Page 113 and 114: Linking Subnational and Supranation
Page 115 and 116: Efficacy of Sanctions against Energ
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Page 120 and 121: Responding to the Closing of Democr
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Page 124 and 125: Soft Power and Security DANIEL RUND
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Page 128 and 129: sense of—and account for—the wi
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Page 132 and 133: Despite its impressive economic gro
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Page 136 and 137: Winning the War of Ideas FARAH PAND
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Page 140 and 141: contributors JON B. ALTERMAN is a s
Page 142 and 143: MICHAEL J. GREEN is senior vice pre
Page 144 and 145: FARAH PANDITH is a senior fellow at
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