GLOBAL FORECAST

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America’s Changing Role in the World KATHLEEN H. HICKS EVERY DAY, IT SEEMS AMERICANS AWAKEN TO A CRISIS SIGNIFYING A WORLD OUT OF THEIR CONTROL. In Europe, our allies and partners are coping with Russian aggression, ranging from cyber attacks and energy coercion to conventional military might and a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons. At the same time, Europe grapples with the world’s most significant migration crisis since World War II. In Asia, satellite images of China’s aggressive island-building activities are widely viewed as corroborating that nation’s designs to control 12 | Center for Strategic and International Studies
the air and sea space far from its shores. Meanwhile, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un continues his family’s legacy of dangerous provocations and nuclear ambition. As significant as the security situation is in these two regions, no area of the world is in greater tumult than the Middle East. From the destabilizing role of Iran to the chaos of Libya to the complete destruction of Syria and its implications for Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and beyond, the upheaval appears endless. The international system is shifting in ways not yet fully understood. Critics have pointed out the Obama administration’s failure to articulate its vision for the U.S. role in a world evolving along so many dimensions. Yet the administration is not alone: no significant historian, analyst, or politician has done so either, including the administration’s harshest critics. Policymakers should keep three factors in mind when devising such a vision. The first key factor shaping the role of the United States today is the paradox of enduring superpower status combined with lessening global influence. The United States will likely remain the world’s sole superpower for at least the next 15 years. The nation boasts enviable demographics, economics and innovation, natural resources, cultural reach, and of course military power. At the same time, its ability to shape the behavior of other actors is lessening. How well the United States can wield power, and how much it chooses to do so, will vary by region and issue. Nonstate problems, for instance, are particularly difficult to tackle with existing U.S. foreign policy tools. Moreover, driving long-term solutions, such as improved governance capacity in places like Iraq, takes a generational investment and typically a whole-of-government and multinational approach. The United States has proven neither particularly patient for nor adept at such lengthy and multilateral strategies. On the other hand, where there is an assertive nation-state competitor—such as Iran, Russia, North Korea, and China—traditional U.S. security strengths tend to be more influential. Even in these cases, however, the United States has had difficulty deterring a wide range of provocations and coercive actions that run counter to its security interests. A second factor that should inform the vision for U.S. foreign policy is the constancy of American public support for international engagement. If there is a theme in American grand strategy that has persisted for the past 70 years, it is that taking a leading role in the world is generally to the benefit of U.S. interests. Those interests have themselves remained remarkably consistent: ensuring the security of U.S. territory and citizens; upholding treaty commitments, to include the security of allies; ensuring a liberal economic order in which American enterprise can compete fairly; and upholding the rule of law in international affairs, including respect for human rights. Each presidential administration has framed these interests somewhat differently, and of course each has pursued its own particular path in seeking to secure them, but the core tenets have not varied significantly. An isolationist sentiment will always Global Forecast 2016 | 13
Page 1: 2016 GLOBAL FORECAST editors CRAIG
Page 4 and 5: about csis For over 50 years, the C
Page 6 and 7: Introduction CRAIG COHEN WASHINGTON
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Page 10 and 11: Reconnecting of Asia JOHN J. HAMRE
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Page 16 and 17: A selective engagement approach to
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Page 26 and 27: ISIS (Re)Writes History JON B. ALTE
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Page 32 and 33: Iran after the Agreement ANTHONY H.
Page 34 and 35: understanding that the United State
Page 36 and 37: Israeli military leaders predict th
Page 40 and 41: Putin’s Europe HEATHER A. CONLEY
Page 42 and 43: far-right, anti-Semitic Jobbik part
Page 44 and 45: Predicting Russian behavior is hard
Page 46 and 47: A NATO Strategy for the Eastern Fla
Page 48 and 49: Sino-Russian Cooperation JEFFREY MA
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Page 54 and 55: Reform Cold, Politics Hot: Presiden
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By 2030, the Asia-Pacific region wi
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is not expected to be a major playe
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North Korean Vulnerability? VICTOR
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downturn in the country’s stock e
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PART 6 africa
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Responses in Nigeria, South Africa,
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Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa THO
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states, sustaining itself through k
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PART 7 inside the pentagon Global F
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Three Fiscal Futures In the final w
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The Battle over How to Save Defense
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apid acquisition actually happened
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90 | Center for Strategic and Inter
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What is one of the most significant
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Nuclear Deterrence in a Disordered
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The Need for Global Zero SHARON SQU
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faith on effective measures relatin
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Increased interest in missile-based
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state and substate actors has becom
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PART 9 energy and security
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Implications of Sustained Low Oil P
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e used to partially offset this “
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Linking Subnational and Supranation
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Efficacy of Sanctions against Energ
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Iran. Both Russia and Iran can accu
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Responding to the Closing of Democr
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er to support the consolidation of
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Soft Power and Security DANIEL RUND
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After the Ebola Catastrophe J. STEP
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sense of—and account for—the wi
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Food Insecurity, Conflict, and Stab
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Despite its impressive economic gro
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prisoners in a gesture of good fait
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Winning the War of Ideas FARAH PAND
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versity of religious belief, includ
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contributors JON B. ALTERMAN is a s
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MICHAEL J. GREEN is senior vice pre
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FARAH PANDITH is a senior fellow at
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GLOBAL FORECAST

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