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JS MDA MDMP N2C2 NATO NEC NMS NMS-CO NSA OCO OGPC OSD PLA RCAF SBIRS SCI SecDef SJS TTP USAF UCP Joint Staff (U.S.) Maritime Domain Awareness Military Decision Making Process NORAD and NORTHCOM Command Center North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Event Conference National Military Strategy National Military Strategy-Cyberspace Operations National Security Agency Offensive Cyber Operations Operation GLADIATOR PHOENIX Conference Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.) People’s Liberation Army Royal Canadian Air Force Space-Based Infrared System Special Compartmented Information Secretary of Defense (U.S.) Strategic Joint Staff (Canada) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures U.S. Air Force Unified Command Plan xvi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since 1958, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has a proven history of adapting and evolving to meet changing military defense challenges using new technology—from its early years providing ground-based radar warning of approaching Soviet bombers, to ground-based radar warning of in-bound Soviet ICBMS, to satellite-based warning of any missile launch occurring around the world, to extended radar warning of approaching cruise missiles, to the warning of suspect maritime vessels approaching North America. Overall, NORAD has sole responsibility for receiving early warnings from numerous space-based and ground-based sensors and developing an integrated North American attack assessment. Because all of the sensors feeding into NORAD travel across the broader “information superhighway,” there exists a genuine risk of potentially hostile nations conducting damaging cyberspace operations against NORAD (to include blinding NORAD to actual threats or feeding the Command false information for incorrect action.) With the recent increase in worldwide cyberspace events, NORAD has thus begun examining its own potential role in this new operational domain. An exact definition regarding what constitutes a “cyber attack” remains in flux. Despite this lack of definition, however, both the U.S. and Canada have been quick to establish new, dedicated military organizations specializing in conducting cyberspace operations. Further, current military cyberspace event conferences now share warning information between U.S. Combatant Commands around the world, to include the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center. (One area of concern: current U.S. classification policies restrict the sharing of certain classified information with Canadian NORAD members.) Over the course of 50 years, NORAD has repeatedly reassessed, redefined, and updated its core operational missions based upon a constantly evolving threat. The NORAD Agreement clearly reflects both Nation’s desire that NORAD be able to adapt and defend against newly evolving military threats which each nation may jointly face. xvii
Page 1 and 2: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY,
Page 3 and 4: REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Appr
Page 5 and 6: Approved for public release; distri
Page 7 and 8: ABSTRACT For more than fifty years,
Page 9 and 10: TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..
Page 11 and 12: 1. Advantages, Disadvantages and We
Page 13 and 14: LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. North Ame
Page 15 and 16: LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Cyberspace
Page 17: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 21 and 22: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I feel very fortuna
Page 23 and 24: I. INTRODUCTION A. PROBLEM STATEMEN
Page 25 and 26: This thesis then developed three co
Page 27 and 28: II. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW A. INTRODU
Page 29 and 30: Based upon the remarkable success o
Page 31 and 32: Later, because of growing concerns
Page 33 and 34: 3. Cruise Missile Warning While ICB
Page 35 and 36: C. NORAD’S NEW MARITIME WARNING M
Page 37 and 38: When asked about the pending NORAD
Page 39 and 40: Director Clapper then identified to
Page 41 and 42: Level 2. Software tools that can be
Page 43 and 44: First, the Tallinn group developed
Page 45 and 46: More importantly, the NATO definiti
Page 47 and 48: DODIN Operations. “Operations to
Page 49 and 50: As can be seen, the topic of “cyb
Page 51 and 52: 3. U.S. Northern Command Created in
Page 53 and 54: 5. U.S. Cyber Command Created in 20
Page 55 and 56: Figure 16. DND and SJS Crests. 2. S
Page 57 and 58: 4. Canadian Forces Information Oper
Page 59 and 60: Figure 19. Cyber Event Conferences.
Page 61 and 62: Finally, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM C
Page 63 and 64: III. LITERATURE REVIEW A. INTRODUCT
Page 65 and 66: Maritime warning consists of proces
Page 67 and 68: Initiative #10. Define and develop
Page 69 and 70:
of peace and crisis, and develop th
Page 71 and 72:
c. National Military Strategy (2011
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This publication discusses cyberspa
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MINDFUL that in the years since the
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IV. COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT A
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4. Disadvantages and Proposed Solut
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Requires negotiating new cyberspace
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E. SUMMARY This chapter identified
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V. COURSES OF ACTION ANALYSIS A. ME
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2. COA #1 Synopsis COA #1 is a prom
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Requires negotiating new cyberspace
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DISADVANTAGES SOLUTIONS WEIGHT Modi
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Under this COA, existing classified
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Change DOD conference procedures to
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A.
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Finally, COA #3 proposes a joint NO
Page 101 and 102:
LIST OF REFERENCES “2014: Piracy,
Page 103 and 104:
Lawson,Sean. “DOD’s ‘First’
Page 105 and 106:
———. Joint Publication 3-12R
Page 107:
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. Defens
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SCHOOL THESIS

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