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SCHOOL THESIS

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I. INTRODUCTION<br />

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT<br />

For more than fifty years, North American Aerospace Defense Command<br />

(NORAD) has been responsible for conducting aerospace warning and aerospace control<br />

for North America. These two aerospace missions involve the combined efforts of<br />

military forces of both the U.S. and Canada to detect airborne threats approaching or<br />

flying within North America (aerospace warning), and then taking appropriate actions to<br />

determine the aircraft of interest’s actual intentions (aerospace control). The commander<br />

of NORAD is responsible for making an official assessment to the president and the<br />

Canadian prime minister if North America is under aerospace attack.<br />

Similarly, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is responsible for defending<br />

the U.S. military’s cyberspace enterprise. The commander of USCYBERCOM is<br />

responsible for making an official assessment to the president if the U.S. military is under<br />

cyber attack. Would involving NORAD in the military cyber attack assessment process,<br />

leveraging its unique and proven binational structure, provide any advantages?<br />

This thesis explores a new NORAD role in cyberspace defense, which is not one<br />

of its legacy air defense missions. However, there exists precedence for adding a new,<br />

non-aerospace related mission to NORAD; that being, the addition of the Maritime<br />

Warning mission to NORAD in 2006.<br />

With cyber attacks by nation-states on the rise, this thesis investigates if there is<br />

an advantage in involving the assessment of military cyber attacks with a binational<br />

military command. Potential advantages may include operational efficiencies, improved<br />

cyberspace defense readiness, and/or enhanced situational awareness of a precursor<br />

cyberspace attack before any kinetic attack upon North America. Disadvantages may<br />

involve difficulties sharing cyberspace defense information between U.S. and Canadian<br />

cyberspace defense agencies, or an actual lessening of operational effectiveness of<br />

USCYBERCOM cyberspace defense operations themselves.<br />

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