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References Cited Annayev, D. (2016a) “Turkmenistan is Rated a Low Terrorism Risk”, Caravanserai, 23 November. Annayev, D. (2016b) “Turkmenistan Suspends Visa-Free Travel with Uzbekistan”, Caravanserai, 10 November. Annayev, D. (2016c) “Turkmen Government Keeps Sharp Eye on Extremists”, Caravanserai, 09 November. Anonymous (2015) “U.S. Confirms Training Tajik Ex-Police Commander Who Joined IS”, Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty, 30 May. Anonymous (2016a) “21 Radical Group Members Detained in Western Kazakhstan”, Kazinform, 31 August. Anonymous (2016b) “Kazakhstan: Gunmen Attack Gun Shops and Army Unit in Aktobe”, BBC, 5 June. Anonymous (2016c) “Kazakhstan NSC: Activities of 7 Radical Groups are Stopped in Kazakhstan”, BNews, 5 October. Anonymous (2016d) “Kazakhstan: Suspect in Almaty Shootings Speaks”, EurasiaNet, 28 July. Anonymous (2016e) “Tajik Interior Ministry Puts 29 ISIL Suspects on Wanted List”, Caravanserai, 29 November. Anonymous (2016f) “Tajikistan’s Khalimov and Son Appear in New Social Media Photo”, Caravanserai, 29 November. Ataeva, G. (2016) “IS in Central Asia: A Myth?”, Central Eurasian Scholars & Media Initiative, 18 February. Bahrom, N. (2016) “Tajikistan Tightens Laws Against Terrorism”, Caravanserai, 15 November. Bogatik, A. (2016) “Kazakhstani Army Holds Counter-Terrorism Exercises”, Caravanserai, 24 November. Corley, F. (2016) “Turkmenistan: Imprisoned Muslim leader – Alive or Dead?”, Forum 18, 26 September. Kamalov, E. (2016) “Kyrgyzstan Monitoring Accounts Tied to Extremist Organisations”, Caravanserai, 2 December. Morris, D. (2016) “ISIS in Central Asia: Threat or Illusion?”, Foreign Brief, 21 March. Nazarov, U. (2016) “Kyrgyz Youth Launch Anti-Extremism Movement”, Caravanserai, 30 November. Roggio, B. and Weiss, C. (2016) “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Faction Emerges After Group’s Collapse”, The Long War Journal, 14 June. Toleukhanova, A. (2016) “Kazakhstan’s Latest Shooting: Terror or Crime?”, EurasiaNet, 18 July. US Department of State (2011) “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Turkmenistan”, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State, Washington DC, United States. Yeniseyev, M. (2016a) “Possible Uzbekistani Child Becomes ISIL Executioner”, Caravanserai, 23 November. Yeniseyev, M. (2016b) “Terror Threat in Uzbekistan Remains Low: Report”, Caravanserai, 30 November. 28
Did the Stability of the North Korean Government Increase in 2016? Ryan Haag The stability of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) can be defined as Kim Jong-un maintaining a power base from which to exert control, and thus limiting any internal attempts to challenge the regime. The stability of the DPRK will be assessed by analyzing the status of the government prior to 2016, evaluating current methods of control by Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, and assessing the contemporary status of the country’s emerging market economy and subsequent nuclear testing. It can be stated with moderate confidence that the stability of the DPRK government has marginally increased in 2016. Background Kim Jong-un had little time to prepare for the position of Supreme Leader, which he assumed in 2011. When his father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, came to power in 1994, he was already well known by ordinary citizens and the governing elite. Conversely, Kim Jong-un had minimal time to amalgamate his power and establish authority (Park 2014:8- 9). Consequently, since attaining power, Kim Jong-un has attempted to ensure that he has sole authority over the country. This became quite clear in 2013, when he executed his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who was considered the second most powerful man in the country during Kim Jong-il’s regime (Cha and Ellen 2014:37). Although executions of high-level officials are nothing new, the execution of Jang Song-thaek created a tumultuous environment by instilling fear and uncertainty within the government. This did not necessarily create instability, nor prove conducive to stability. Rather, an environment of persistent scrutiny fermented that can be detrimental to Kim Jong-un’s strategic legitimacy. Kim Jong-un has also reportedly attempted to establish tighter border controls with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the last few years (Shim 2015). 29
Page 1 and 2: • Will gun control legislation be
Page 3 and 4: • Will gun control legislation be
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Page 7 and 8: Table of Contents Foreword page 07
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The Research Institute for
Page 11 and 12: Introduction Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
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Page 15 and 16: Will Gun Control Legislation be Int
Page 17 and 18: nomination is confirmed, ensuing Su
Page 19 and 20: Does Jemaah Islamiyah Continue to P
Page 21 and 22: violent clash between a radical min
Page 23 and 24: How Has Russia’s Involvement in t
Page 25 and 26: More recently, on November 13, 2016
Page 27 and 28: How Popular is ISIS in Central Asia
Page 29: addition, ex-colonel Gulmurod Khali
Page 33 and 34: country. If the items originate fro
Page 35 and 36: Did Boko Haram Grow Stronger in 201
Page 37 and 38: loss of support within the Muslim c
Page 39 and 40: Will the Prospect of an Independent
Page 41 and 42: Syria. Considering the words of Pes
Page 43 and 44: Is France Winning the Ground War Ag
Page 45 and 46: Ansar Dine is one of five active Is
Page 47 and 48: Did Islamist Non-State Actors Come
Page 49 and 50: If the threat of having to transpor
Page 51 and 52: Will Nigeria Continue to be Africa
Page 53 and 54: Recent Developments Angola’s rece
Page 55 and 56: References Cited Anonymous (2016a)
Page 57 and 58: Will the Palestinian Groups Hamas a
Page 59 and 60: conference of the pro-Israel Americ
Page 61 and 62: References Cited Abrams, E. and Uri
Page 63 and 64: Biographical Notes on Contributors
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