The Intelligence Review | volume 1 | issue 2 |

Conclusion
When analyzing the complete history of Boko Haram, we can identify two predominant
patterns of activity. The first pattern is the rise of an insurgency, which took place from
2002 to 2015. During this 13-year span, Boko Haram gained vast amounts of political
support throughout northeastern Nigeria by effectively winning the hearts and minds of
the people who were dissatisfied with the official government of their country. During that
phase, the amount of political support gained by Boko Haram was in the sizeable amount
of territory controlled by the group. However, this ultimately led to the initiation of a
military campaign against Boko Haram, which introduces the second pattern: that of a
weakening organization. Once Boko Haram began to lose control of its expanded territory
they became dependent on guerilla warfare tactics, such as suicide bombings and the use
of improvised explosive devices, and increased their attacks on Muslim targets. As a
consequence, Boko Haram began to lose some of its political support in the Lake Chad
region, which in turn drove ISIS’ senior leadership to appoint a new spiritual leader. The
power-struggle that quickly ensued, forced Shekau into a situation that many analysts
believe is the weakest moment of the group’s history: namely the decision to release 21 of
the abducted Chibok girls, in the hope of recovering veteran fighters and stalling the
government’s military campaign. However, this strategy ultimately failed due to the
Nigerian military’s sudden advancement deep into the Sambisa Forest in the closing days
of 2016, which in turn led to the possible relocation of Boko Haram elsewhere in the
region. Therefore, when analyzing solely the events that took place throughout 2016, it is
now clear that the Nigerian government and the coalition forces have momentum in the
conflict against the insurgency group in the Lake Chad region. That is why I believe, with
high confidence, that Boko Haram has not grown stronger in 2016.
References Cited
Anonymous (2015) Boko Haram, The American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, DC, 6
December.
European Parliament (2014) In-Depth Analysis Insecurity in Context: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria,
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, European Union, Brussels,
Belgium.
Onuoha, F.C. (2016) “Split in ISIS-Aligned Boko Haram Group”, Al Jazeera Center for Studies,
17 October accessed on 6 December, 2016.
Pate, A. (2015) Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options, National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, The University of Maryland,
pp11-25.
RAND Corporation (2008) Assessing Irregular Warfare, United States Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, United States.
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