Law for The Poor

2370 FORDHAM LA WREVIEW
[Vol. 78
Compliance rates in mandatory jurisdictions have varied dramatically, from
roughly thirty to ninety percent, while compliance rates have generally been
much lower in voluntary jurisdictions. 59 In the two decades since Florida
first enacted a reporting requirement in 1994, the number of lawyers
providing pro bono assistance to the poor has increased by 35%, the number
of hours has increased by 160%, and financial contributions have increased
by 243%.60 Whether voluntary reporting systems have had Similar impact
remains unclear. However, at the very least, such reporting systems have
the potential to encourage pro bono work and to pressure firms into giving
credit to lawyers who provide it. At the local level, many city and county
bar associations have made pro bono a priority. For example, Chicago,
New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and the District of Columbia all
have events and projects that bring together law firms and nonprofit legal
organizations to enhance pro bono activity. 61
4. The Market for Talent: The Role of Rankings and Reputation
Professional initiatives have interacted with .powerful market-based
incentives for public service, particularly law firm rankings by major legal
publications. Before the development of such rankings, relatively few large
firms had programs designed to promote and monitor pro bono activity. In
the early 1970s, a major study found fewer than twenty-five formal
programs, and even fewer pro bono counsel positions of the type now
common at large firms. 62 An important impetus for the formation of these
early programs was a desire to compete with public interest and legal
services organizations, which were attracting graduates of elite law schools
during a wave of progressive student activism. 63 A few leading firms in the
regions most directly competitive with public interest organizations,
especially Washington D.C. and New York, began establishing formal pro
states that have voluntary regimes, see ABA State Reporting Policies, supra; see also Kellie
Isbell & Sarah Sawle, Current Development, Pro Bono Publico: Voluntary Service and
Mandatory Reporting, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845 (2002).
59. See ABA State Reporting Policies, supra note 58.
60. STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO LEGAL SERV., REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
FLORIDA, THE FLORIDA BAR, AND THE FLORIDA BAR FOUNDATION ON THE VOLUNTARY PRO
BONO ATTORNEY PLAN 3 (2006) [hereinafter FLORIDA PRO BONO REPORT].
61. For an example, see Chicago Bar Association, 2009 Pro Bono Week,
http://www.chicagobar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=ProBonoWeek_2009&Template-/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfmn&ContentID=4849 (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
62. The three most common institutional arrangements were as follows: "(a) a firm
committee handled or reviewed intake of pro bono cases, and individual lawyers associated
themselves with cases of interest; (b) the firm committed itself to release lawyers for fulltime
public interest work or maintained a separate office for legal aid work; and (c)
individual lawyers determined their own amounts and types of public interest work and felt
that the firm supported and encouraged pro bono work." JOEL F. HANDLER, ELLEN JANE
HOLLINGSWORTH & HOWARD S. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS
123-24 (1978).
63. Id. at 45-46; see also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 278-79 (1976); F. RAYMOND MARKS ET AL., THE
LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 204- 10 (1972).