China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

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Secretary Hazel O’Leary) for its policies. Prather cited three policies as responsible
for security problems at the labs: support for the CTBT; a “reckless policy” of
unprecedented “openness” that declassified much nuclear weapon information, so
that spying was unnecessary; and engaging the PRC nuclear weapon establishment
with the DOE’s lab-to-lab exchanges. 35
China Confirmed Its Neutron Bomb. On July 15, 1999, the PRC
government issued a response denying the Cox Committee’s charges that China stole
U.S. secrets. In the report was a short paragraph acknowledging that China had the
neutron bomb. The statement said China mastered “in succession the neutron bomb
technology and nuclear weapon miniaturization technology.” In addition, “since
China has already possessed atom bomb and H-bomb technologies, it is quite logical
and natural for it to master the neutron bomb technology through its own efforts over
a reasonable period of time.” 36
PFIAB (Rudman) Report
For a parallel review, on March 18, 1999, President Clinton appointed former
Senator Warren Rudman, head of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board (PFIAB), to undertake a review of how the government handled security
challenges at the labs over the last 20 years. The PFIAB’s special investigative
panel, with four members, reviewed over 700 documents and interviewed over 100
witnesses — who apparently had concerns about reprisals and asked that they not be
named. On June 15, 1999, the PFIAB issued an unprecedented unclassified report,
with findings and recommendations for both the Executive and Legislative
Branches. 37 These findings and recommendations are summarized below.
Findings.
! Twenty years after the creation of DOE, most of its security
problems “still exist today.”
! The national labs “have been and will continue to be a major target
of foreign intelligence services, friendly as well as hostile.”
! “Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture of
arrogance — both at DOE headquarters and the labs themselves —
conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting to happen.”
35 Prather, James Gordon, “A Technical Reassessment of the Conclusions and Implications
of the Cox Committee’s Report,” July 8, 1999. See also: Jack Kemp’s press release, July
8, 1999, and Robert D. Novak, “Republican China-Bashing,” Washington Post, July 12,
1999. For copies of report, contact Jack Kemp’s office or Home Page of Polyconomics, Inc.
36 PRC, Information Office of the State Council, “Facts Speak Louder Than Words and Lies
Will Collapse by Themselves — Further Refutation of the Cox Report,” July 15, 1999.
37 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Special Investigative Panel, Science at
its Best, Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of
Energy, unclassified, June 1999.