China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

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information. (Other countries may include Russia.) The review panel’s note on the
damage assessment also warned of the dangers of exchanges between U.S. and PRC
or Russian nuclear weapon specialists, urging that a separate net assessment be done
on such formal and informal contacts. Yet, the panel also noted that “the value of
these contacts to the U.S., including to address issues of concern — safety, command
and control, and proliferation — should not be lost in our concern about protecting
secrets.”
Another report on PRC espionage included warnings about exchanges at the
labs. According a 1999 report by the CIA and FBI, “PRC scientists, through
mutually beneficial scientific exchange programs, gather [science and technology]
information through U.S. national laboratories.” 260
China’s nuclear weapon facilities have included the China Academy of
Engineering Physics (CAEP), also known as the Ninth Academy, at Mianyang,
Sichuan province; Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
(IAPCM), in Beijing; High Power Laser Laboratory, in Shanghai; and Northwest
Institute of Nuclear Technology (NINT), near Xian. 261 China’s nuclear weapon
installations were reorganized as part of changes in the defense industrial sector in
1998 that included the civilianization of the Commission of Science, Technology,
and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) solely under the State Council. PRC
nuclear weapon facilities then became partly subordinated to the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA)’s General Equipment Department that was set up in April 1998 to
centralize and improve control over research and development, production, and
deployment of weapons.
Placing restrictions on the foreign visitor program, however, entailed
implications for U.S. policy on arms control and nonproliferation. The
Administration argued that foreign exchanges have not compromised U.S. security
and have not involved weapon secrets. Moreover, contacts with foreign nuclear
scientists have allowed U.S. nuclear weapon labs to learn about the secretive nuclear
weapon establishment in China — especially as it was undergoing changes. In
October 1998, John Browne, Director of Los Alamos, testified that “access to
classified information by foreign nationals is not allowed” in DOE’s foreign visitor
program. 262 The Administration said that engagement of PRC and other scientists
have fostered support for arms control and nonproliferation objectives as well as
advanced U.S. interests in making sure that foreign nuclear powers have sufficient
260 CIA and FBI, “Report to Congress on Chinese Espionage Activities Against the United
States,” December 1999, released March 8, 2000.
261 Department of Commerce, “Entity List, Entities of Proliferation Concern Listed in
Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations,” updated
November 19, 1998;” Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Reference
Document DI-1921-60A-98, “China’s International Defense-Industrial Organizations,” June
1998; Conference at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 1997.
262 105 th Congress, Hearing of the House National Security Subcommittee on Military
Procurement, “Department of Energy’s Foreign Visitor Program,” October 6, 1998.