China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

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was born. 219 In 1998, after having allegedly downloaded files to portable computer
tapes in 1993, 1994, and 1997, Lee reportedly worked in Taiwan as a consultant to
the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology, a vast military research and
development organization. During a visit to Taiwan in December 1998, Lee was said
to have dialed up the main computer at Los Alamos and used his password to access
the classified nuclear files he had downloaded. Lee’s trips to Taiwan were approved
at Los Alamos, reported the Washington Post at the end of 1999. 220 On July 5, 2000,
as discussed above, the U.S. Attorney filed a document that named eight foreign
governments that Lee may have sought to help in downloading the nuclear data.
Those places named were: the PRC, Taiwan, Australia, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland, places (except for the PRC) where Lee allegedly
had an interest in applying for work in 1993, when he supposedly feared losing his
job at Los Alamos. 221
Despite these earlier reports, investigators told the Washington Post after
interrogations in November and December 2000 that there were “new questions”
about Lee’s contacts with Taiwan, that they did not know until the questioning that
Lee, in 1998, reportedly received $5,000 from the Chung Shan Institute for
consulting work over six weeks and reportedly failed to report the fee to the Los
Alamos lab. 222 In his book, Lee maintained that the Los Alamos lab “knew about and
approved my consulting work, which was commonly done by lab scientists.” Lee
also wrote that his bank account in Taiwan was set up to help his sister and never
contained more than $3,000. 223
China’s Own Research. Further complicating the case was the debate over
the relative importance of the PRC’s own modernization efforts as opposed to foreign
technology acquisitions. Some said that the investigation overstated the importance
of PRC espionage. 224 Harold Agnew, former director of Los Alamos who oversaw
the design of the W88 warhead decades ago, wrote a letter to the Wall Street Journal
in May 1999. He argued that “those who are screaming the loudest in Washington
have little knowledge or understanding with regard to the issues at hand. The
Chinese nuclear establishment, most of whom have studied in the West, are
extremely competent.” He added that “being able to actually use information from
any of the national laboratories’ codes requires a great deal more knowledge than
following a cake recipe. It’s even questionable as to whether the Chinese computers
are compatible with the weapon codes at our national laboratories. ... The design of
the W88 ... is actually quite old. ... Having a computer printout as I remember them
219 Taiwan has been included on the DOE’s list of sensitive countries.
220 Pincus, Walter, “Lee’s Links to Taiwan Scrutinized,” Washington Post, Dec. 31, 1999.
221 Loeb, Vernon and Walter Pincus, “Lee May Have Shared Copied Data with 8 Nations,
U.S. Says,” Washington Post, July 7, 2000.
222 Pincus, Walter, “Interrogation of Lee Raises New Questions, Sources Say,” Washington
Post, February 4, 2001.
223 Lee, p. 321.
224 Broad, William J., “Spies Versus Sweat: The Debate Over China’s Nuclear Advance,”
New York Times, September 7, 1999.