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China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

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CRS-29<br />

but Representative Cox countered that Habiger had not provided Congress with a<br />

detailed plan for how the additional millions would be used. 99<br />

The first <strong>of</strong>ficial to lose his job as a result <strong>of</strong> the Los Alamos controversy was<br />

Victor Reis, the Assistant Energy Secretary in charge <strong>of</strong> defense programs since<br />

1993, who resigned on June 25, 1999. 100 Testifying before the House Armed<br />

Services Committee on July 14, 1999, Reis acknowledged that he had “some<br />

responsibility” for the security problems and he “could have pressed harder” to<br />

strengthen security, but asserted that many other <strong>of</strong>ficials at DOE and FBI share the<br />

blame. 101<br />

In July 1999, DOE instituted a new policy to require DOE employees with<br />

security clearances to report any “close and continuing contacts” with foreigners from<br />

the sensitive countries on DOE’s list. 102 Also in July, Richardson issued revised<br />

procedures to more closely monitor visits and assignments <strong>of</strong> foreign nationals to<br />

DOE’s facilities, as part <strong>of</strong> implementing PDD-61. Lab directors no longer had<br />

authority to grant waivers <strong>of</strong> DOE security requirements, and only the Secretary had<br />

authority to approve waivers. Richardson also derided discrimination against<br />

Americans <strong>of</strong> Asian Pacific heritage, saying that the new order only affected foreign<br />

citizens, not Americans. 103<br />

On August 12, 1999, Richardson announced the results <strong>of</strong> an internal DOE<br />

inquiry by the inspector general and ordered that three individuals be disciplined.<br />

(See Law Enforcement vs. Security below.)<br />

In October 1999, Richardson decided to narrow the scope <strong>of</strong> controversial<br />

polygraph tests, originally considered for over 5,000 lab employees, so that about<br />

1,000 people working in the most sensitive areas, primarily at the three nuclear<br />

weapon laboratories, would be tested. They included nuclear weapon designers,<br />

security and counterintelligence <strong>of</strong>ficials, employees at nuclear weapon production<br />

plants, and political appointees at DOE headquarters. 104 In December 1999,<br />

Richardson narrowed the number to about 800 employees who would have to take<br />

the lie-detector test. 105<br />

99 Suro, Roberto, “Energy’s Security Initiative Lacks Fuel,” Washington Post, December 2,<br />

1999.<br />

100 Pincus, Walter, “<strong>Nuclear</strong> Officials’ Future Uncertain,” Washington Post, June 25, 1999.<br />

101 Pincus, Walter, “Plenty <strong>of</strong> Blame to Go Around on Spying, DOE’s Ex-Arms Chief Says,”<br />

Washington Post, July 15, 1999.<br />

102 Pincus, Walter and Vernon Loeb, “Isn’t It Romantic: Security Rules Exempt One-Night<br />

Stands,” Washington Post, September 2, 1999.<br />

103 DOE, news release, “Richardson Toughens Requirements for Unclassified Foreign Visits<br />

and Assignments,” July 14, 1999.<br />

104 Pincus, Walter, “Richardson Cuts Lab Lie Tests Sharply,” Washington Post, October 16,<br />

1999.<br />

105 DOE, “DOE Polygraph Implementation Plan Announced,” press release, December 13,<br />

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