China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
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CRS-29<br />
but Representative Cox countered that Habiger had not provided Congress with a<br />
detailed plan for how the additional millions would be used. 99<br />
The first <strong>of</strong>ficial to lose his job as a result <strong>of</strong> the Los Alamos controversy was<br />
Victor Reis, the Assistant Energy Secretary in charge <strong>of</strong> defense programs since<br />
1993, who resigned on June 25, 1999. 100 Testifying before the House Armed<br />
Services Committee on July 14, 1999, Reis acknowledged that he had “some<br />
responsibility” for the security problems and he “could have pressed harder” to<br />
strengthen security, but asserted that many other <strong>of</strong>ficials at DOE and FBI share the<br />
blame. 101<br />
In July 1999, DOE instituted a new policy to require DOE employees with<br />
security clearances to report any “close and continuing contacts” with foreigners from<br />
the sensitive countries on DOE’s list. 102 Also in July, Richardson issued revised<br />
procedures to more closely monitor visits and assignments <strong>of</strong> foreign nationals to<br />
DOE’s facilities, as part <strong>of</strong> implementing PDD-61. Lab directors no longer had<br />
authority to grant waivers <strong>of</strong> DOE security requirements, and only the Secretary had<br />
authority to approve waivers. Richardson also derided discrimination against<br />
Americans <strong>of</strong> Asian Pacific heritage, saying that the new order only affected foreign<br />
citizens, not Americans. 103<br />
On August 12, 1999, Richardson announced the results <strong>of</strong> an internal DOE<br />
inquiry by the inspector general and ordered that three individuals be disciplined.<br />
(See Law Enforcement vs. Security below.)<br />
In October 1999, Richardson decided to narrow the scope <strong>of</strong> controversial<br />
polygraph tests, originally considered for over 5,000 lab employees, so that about<br />
1,000 people working in the most sensitive areas, primarily at the three nuclear<br />
weapon laboratories, would be tested. They included nuclear weapon designers,<br />
security and counterintelligence <strong>of</strong>ficials, employees at nuclear weapon production<br />
plants, and political appointees at DOE headquarters. 104 In December 1999,<br />
Richardson narrowed the number to about 800 employees who would have to take<br />
the lie-detector test. 105<br />
99 Suro, Roberto, “Energy’s Security Initiative Lacks Fuel,” Washington Post, December 2,<br />
1999.<br />
100 Pincus, Walter, “<strong>Nuclear</strong> Officials’ Future Uncertain,” Washington Post, June 25, 1999.<br />
101 Pincus, Walter, “Plenty <strong>of</strong> Blame to Go Around on Spying, DOE’s Ex-Arms Chief Says,”<br />
Washington Post, July 15, 1999.<br />
102 Pincus, Walter and Vernon Loeb, “Isn’t It Romantic: Security Rules Exempt One-Night<br />
Stands,” Washington Post, September 2, 1999.<br />
103 DOE, news release, “Richardson Toughens Requirements for Unclassified Foreign Visits<br />
and Assignments,” July 14, 1999.<br />
104 Pincus, Walter, “Richardson Cuts Lab Lie Tests Sharply,” Washington Post, October 16,<br />
1999.<br />
105 DOE, “DOE Polygraph Implementation Plan Announced,” press release, December 13,<br />
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