China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

CRS-31
April 1997) ordered new security measures (called the Curtis Plan) 110 , but those steps
— including requiring background checks again for all foreign visitors — were not
carried out by the labs nor followed up by DOE officials. They also voiced concerns
about related developments reported in the press, specifically that in April 1997, the
FBI recommended changes at the labs, including reinstating background checks on
foreign visitors, but the DOE did not implement improvements in counterintelligence
until after Bill Richardson became Secretary of Energy (in August 1998). In the
spring of 1997, DOE had selected the suspect to head a program to update the
computer programming used in the stockpile stewardship program that evaluates the
performance of nuclear weapons without testing, and he hired a PRC citizen to assist
him. 111 Moreover, some critics questioned why the President did not issue PDD-61
until February 1998, although the suspicions that China obtained W88 data arose in
1995 and the FBI made recommendations to tighten counterintelligence measures in
April 1997. 112
The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), led by former
Senator Rudman, reported in June 1999 that “the speed and sweep of the [Clinton]
Administration’s ongoing response does not absolve it of its responsibility in years
past,” and “there is some evidence to raise questions about whether its actions came
later than they should have.” The PFIAB also noted that “the track record of
previous administrations’ responses to DOE’s problems is mixed.” 113
The PFIAB noted that PDD-61 was issued on February 11, 1998, and after
Secretary Richardson was sworn in on August 18, he submitted the action plan to the
NSC on November 13. However, the DOE’s completed implementation plan was
delivered to Secretary Richardson on February 3, 1999 and issued to the labs on
March 4. The board said that “we find unacceptable the more than four months that
elapsed before DOE advised the National Security Advisor on the actions taken and
specific remedies developed to implement the Presidential directive, particularly one
so crucial.” PFIAB further declared that “the fact that the Secretary’s implementation
plan was not issued to the labs until more than a year after the PDD was issued tells
us DOE is still unconvinced of Presidential authority [PFIAB’s emphasis].”
On July 2, 1999, House Commerce Committee chairman Tom Bliley and
Representative Fred Upton, chairman of the Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee, issued a joint statement one day after receiving a classified briefing
110 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 12, 1999.
111 Risen, James, “Suspect Scientist Led Key Los Alamos Program,” New York Times,
March 24, 1999.
112 Risen, James and Jeff Gerth, “China Stole Nuclear Secrets From Los Alamos, U.S.
Officials Say,” New York Times, March 6, 1999; David E. Sanger, “Clinton Aides Admit
Lapses On Espionage by Chinese,” New York Times, March 7, 1999; Jeff Gerth, “Nuclear
Lapses Known in ‘96, Aides Now Say,” New York Times, March 17, 1999; Vernon Loeb
and Juliet Eilperin, “GOP Attacks’ Impact on China Ties Concerns White House,”
Washington Post, March 17, 1999.
113 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Special Investigative Panel,
Science at its Best, Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S.
Department of Energy, unclassified, June 1999.