China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

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control over nuclear materials to prevent leaks to rogue states. 263 The former Director
of Los Alamos argued that “any contact with China’s nuclear weapons establishment
needed to be clearly focused to avoid aiding their weapons program. Hence, the
Department of Energy authorized only small, restricted interactions on nuclear
materials protection and verification technologies for arms control treaties. These
activities were and still are clearly in our national security interest.” 264 Testifying
before the Cox Committee in October 1998, C. Paul Robinson, director of Sandia,
stated that “the lab-to-lab program with China has been beneficial in several ways.
It provides the United States with perhaps its only window on the Chinese nuclear
weapons program. . . Moreover, the program has helped promote the establishment
of an arms control program in China.” 265
U.S.-China Relations
The disclosures about suspected PRC espionage at the U.S. labs further
complicated the Administration’s policy of engagement with China. Vice President
Gore said on March 9, 1999, that “having a relationship with [China] within which
we can try to affect their behavior and improve human rights, eliminate unfair trade
practices, and bring about the kinds of changes that will lead to further
democratization in China, these things are in our interest.” 266 On March 11, 1999,
President Clinton first defended his policy against charges of laxity in dealing with
China and asserted that engagement “has paid dividends” for U.S. interests in
weapon nonproliferation, Korea, and the Asian financial crisis. He also argued
against an “isolated no-contact” relationship with Beijing. 267 In a major speech on
China policy on the eve of PRC Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit, President Clinton again
explained that seeking to resolve differences with China cannot be achieved “by
confronting China or trying to contain her,” but through a “policy of principled,
purposeful engagement with China’s leaders and China’s people.” 268
Some critics charged that the W88 case showed that engagement did not
adequately protect U.S. national security interests, and a more confrontational policy
— some called containment — should be pursued. They said that the credibility of
the White House on China policy had been further eroded and that engagement had
263 Prindle, Nancy, “The U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program,”
Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1998; Wen L. Hsu, “The Impact of Government
Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policymaking,”
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1999.
264 Hecker, Siegfried S., “Between Science and Security,” Washington Post, March 21, 1999.
265 Statement of C. Paul Robinson, U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S.
National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,
October 14, 1998.
266 Harris, John F. and Walter Pincus, “Gore Defends U.S. Stance On China, Security
Issues,” Washington Post, March 10, 1999.
267 President William Jefferson Clinton, remarks at the signing ceremony and summit closing
in Guatemala, March 11, 1999.
268 President William Jefferson Clinton, speech sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace,
April 7, 1999.