China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
CRS-49<br />
in the investigation, Charles Washington and Michael Soukup, also said that Lee was<br />
singled out as a suspect because <strong>of</strong> his ethnicity, not because <strong>of</strong> evidence. 199<br />
As published in Lee’s 2001 book, Vrooman earlier had written a letter to<br />
Senator Conrad Burns on May 11, 1999. Vrooman wrote that “the single<br />
distinguishing feature <strong>of</strong> the [administration inquiry done by Mr. Trulock’s staff at<br />
DOE] that identified Lee was the complete lack <strong>of</strong> evidence that he committed<br />
espionage. ... Ethnicity was a crucial component in identifying Lee as a suspect.<br />
Caucasians with the same background as Lee were ignored.” 200<br />
A news report said that Notra Trulock, who wrote the administrative inquiry and<br />
led the investigation until the summer <strong>of</strong> 1996, had compiled a list <strong>of</strong> 70 people at<br />
Los Alamos who visited <strong>China</strong> and then narrowed the list to 12 people. He said he<br />
give the list to the FBI, which then eliminated the other 11 suspects, leaving Wen Ho<br />
Lee as the prime suspect. The initial list <strong>of</strong> 70 people included those with no access<br />
to classified or weapons information and who traveled to <strong>China</strong> on non-work related<br />
trips. One Caucasian scientist, however, who was a specialist in the same field as<br />
Lee (hydrodynamics), worked on classified information, and went to <strong>China</strong> on a<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional trip, was not among the 12. Further, Robert Vrooman said that there<br />
were 15 people who conducted nuclear weapons research and visited <strong>China</strong>, but were<br />
not on the list <strong>of</strong> 12 suspects. 201<br />
Notra Trulock, who headed the counterintelligence investigation at DOE,<br />
insisted that “race was never a factor.” 202 The DOE investigator who focused on Lee,<br />
Daniel Bruno, said on November 1, 2000, that Lee was the prime suspect because <strong>of</strong><br />
his behavior, not because <strong>of</strong> his ethnicity. 203<br />
Senators Thompson and Lieberman, whose Governmental Affairs Committee<br />
reviewed the investigation, wrote on August 26, 1999, that “the evidence we have<br />
seen and heard provides no basis for the claim that the initial DOE-FBI inquiry<br />
focused upon the Lees because <strong>of</strong> their race. Only much later in the process, once<br />
Mr. Lee had already been identified as the chief suspect, did the investigation<br />
consider the Lees’ ethnicity — and then only because, according to FBI<br />
counterintelligence experts, Beijing’s intelligence actively tries to recruit Chinese<br />
American scientists working in sensitive U.S. facilities.” 204 One <strong>of</strong> these experts,<br />
Paul Moore, who headed the FBI’s counterintelligence efforts against <strong>China</strong> from<br />
199 Loeb, Vernon and Walter Pincus, “Espionage Whistleblower Resigns,” Washington Post,<br />
August 24, 1999.<br />
200 Lee, p. 158.<br />
201 James Sterngold, “U.S. to Reduce Case Against Scientist to a Single Charge,” New York<br />
Times, September 11, 2000.<br />
202 Broad, William J., “Official Denies Spy Suspect Was Victim <strong>of</strong> Bias,” New York Times,<br />
August 19, 1999.<br />
203 Loeb, Vernon, “Prober: Lee’s Ethnicity Wasn’t Factor,” Washington Post, November 2,<br />
2000.<br />
204 Thompson, Fred and Joseph Lieberman, “On the Chinese Espionage Investigation,”<br />
(letter to the editor), Washington Post, August 26, 1999.