China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

CRS-22
Act (H.R. 1555) to correct what he saw as deficiencies in the Defense Authorization
Act. Some Members said it was premature to allege noncompliance, since the
effective date was specified as March 1, 2000. In November 1999, the House and
Senate passed H.R. 1555 without provisions on security at the DOE labs.
A CRS legal memorandum for Representative Thornberry (that was made
public) agreed that President Clinton’s statement and directions raised legal and
constitutional issues on the question of the Administration’s compliance with the law
creating the NNSA. 73
On January 7, 2000, Secretary Richardson submitted DOE’s plan for
implementation of legislation to establish the NNSA on March 1, 2000 and named
a committee to search for the first Under Secretary for Nuclear Security to serve as
the head of NNSA. 74
However, Richardson’s plan raised questions about the semi-autonomous status
of the NNSA, calling for some DOE officials to “serve concurrently” in some
functions, including nuclear security and counter-intelligence. He cited reasons such
as “program continuity,” “shortness of time for implementation,” and the “scheduled
change in executive branch administration next January.” Field managers at some
field operations would also “serve concurrently in dual positions.”
Indeed, a special panel of the House Armed Services Committee, with
Representatives Thornberry, Tauscher, Hunter, Graham, Ryun, Gibbons, Sisisky, and
Spratt, reviewed DOE’s implementation plan and cited some “serious flaws.” 75
While the panel was encouraged by DOE’s responses, it criticized the plan for “dualhatting”
DOE and NNSA officials; continuing the confused and inadequate lines of
authority (e.g., with no changes in the field office structure); emphasizing DOE
authority; lacking improvements to NNSA programming and budgeting; lacking
specificity and comprehensiveness; and reflecting little outside consultation. The
panel’s report concluded that the implementation plan, if carried out, would “violate
key provisions of the law.” However, Representative Spratt offered his dissenting
views. While he agreed that the implementation plan fell short of the legal
requirements, he objected that the panel’s report was too conclusive and lacked a
critical review of the law that created NNSA and whether it is workable.
73 CRS Memorandum, “Assessment of Legal Issues Raised by the President’s Directions to
the Secretary of Energy With Respect to the Implementation of the National Nuclear
Security Administration Act in His Signing Statement of October 5, 1999,” November 1,
1999, by Morton Rosenberg. The congressional office has released the memo.
74 DOE, “Implementation Plan: National Nuclear Security Administration,” January 1, 2000;
“Energy Department Proceeds with Implementation of National Nuclear Security
Administration,” news release, January 7, 2000.
75 House Armed Services Committee, Special Panel on Department of Energy
Reorganization, “Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration
Implementation Plan: An Assessment,” February 11, 2000.