China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

CRS-59
There were also concerns, investigated by Congress in 1998, that exports of U.S.
satellites resulted in transfers of missile technology to China. 248 Some argued that the
Administration’s export control policies allowed dual-use exports “of great strategic
value” to China that resulted in greater damage to U.S. national security than the
leaks of nuclear weapon data. 249 President Clinton, nonetheless, said that his
Administration was determined to prevent diversions of sensitive technology to
China and placed controls on exports to China that are “tougher than those applied
to any other major exporting country in the world.” 250
Nuclear Cooperation with China. Some questioned whether it was
appropriate for the Administration to have expanded nuclear ties with China,
including exchanges between the two nuclear weapon establishments, while it had
suspicions about security compromises. At the 1997 U.S.-China summit, President
Clinton promised to issue certifications (signed in January 1998) to implement the
1985 nuclear cooperation agreement, and during congressional review, the
Administration did not discuss problems at the labs. 251 At the 1998 U.S.-PRC
summit in Beijing, DOE signed a governmental agreement on peaceful nuclear
cooperation, including exchanges at the labs. 252 The Administration argued that labto-lab
exchanges were not the cause of the alleged security problems.
Concerns About Partisanship. Still others urged policy-makers to move
beyond any partisan debates to urgently upgrade U.S. security at the labs, assess the
potential damage from China’s reported compromise of U.S. secrets, and take
corrective action. They also cautioned against partisan attacks in this case that might
damage broader and longer-term U.S.-China relations that are in U.S. interests, such
as efforts on trade and weapon nonproliferation. They pointed out that, as FBI
Director Freeh confirmed, “great vulnerability” to intelligence compromises of
security at the nuclear weapon labs has been identified since 1988, ten years prior to
PDD-61. Freeh said, “unfortunately, this situation has been well documented for
over ten years.” Those concerns about counterintelligence at DOE included a hearing
247 (...continued)
Performance Computers,” press release, January 8, 1999.
248 See CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers Under U.S.
Satellite Export Policy — Background and Chronology, by Shirley A. Kan.
249 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “U.S. Exports to China, 1988-1998: Fueling
Proliferation,” April 1999.
250 President William Jefferson Clinton, speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace, at the
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1999.
251 See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Missiles: Policy Issues, by Shirley A. Kan.
252 Agreement between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the
State Development Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technologies, June 29, 1998.