China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets

China: Suspected Acquisition of
U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
Challenges to U.S. Security
Congressional Concerns and Policy Issues
In early 1999, Congress heightened concerns about security over nuclear
weapon data at the U.S. nuclear weapon laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Los
Alamos, and Sandia) after public news reports said that the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) may have acquired the design of the W88 nuclear warhead in the 1980s.
This case was the third publicly reported case involving China’s suspected
compromise of U.S. nuclear weapon secrets.
In April 1999, President Clinton stated that the PRC had fewer than two dozen
long-range nuclear weapons, compared to 6,000 in the U.S. arsenal. Nevertheless,
some were concerned that China was developing a new DF-31 solid-fuel, mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with a range of about 5,000 miles,
reportedly with a smaller warhead (700 kg; 1,500 lb.) than the current DF-5A
ICBMs. In addition, China reportedly had programs to develop a next-generation JL-
2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a longer-range ICBM. 1
This controversy about the W-88 warhead raised policy issues about whether
U.S. security was further threatened by the PRC’s suspected use of U.S. nuclear
weapon secrets in its development of smaller nuclear warheads and new ICBMs, as
well as whether the Administration’s response to the security problem was effective
or mishandled and whether it fairly used or abused its investigative and prosecuting
authority. The case also raised questions about the roles of the media and Congress.
Public Cases of Alleged Security Compromises
Suspicions about PRC attempts to acquire secrets from U.S. nuclear weapon
labs were longstanding, including congressional concerns discussed below. A 1994
book on PRC intelligence cited the head of counterintelligence at the Federal Bureau
of Intelligence (FBI) in Los Angeles as saying that the PRC had tried to recruit
people at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore labs. 2 In the three publicly reported
cases that occurred in the late 1970s to 1980s, China may have conducted clandestine
1 See CRS Report 97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by Shirley A. Kan; and CRS
Report 97-1022, Chinese Nuclear Testing and Warhead Development, by Jonathan Medalia.
2 Eftimiades, Nicholas. Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1994), p. 6.