11.01.2013 Views

Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems - Multiple Choices

Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems - Multiple Choices

Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems - Multiple Choices

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

4.4 Port P3 4 PRACTICAL ANALYSIS<br />

mobile device registers itself at base station with at least an Access Point Name (APN) and its<br />

GPRS authentication credentials to get access to the GPRS network. An APN is a hostname<br />

which is associated with the GPRS connection and resolves to the Gateway GPRS Support Node<br />

(GGSN) that provides the connectivity between GPRS core network and the telecom operators<br />

or corporate router. This connectivity is <strong>of</strong>ten, but not necessarily, realized by means <strong>of</strong> a GRE<br />

tunnel between the GGSN and corporate router [34]. A schematic overview <strong>of</strong> a GPRS <strong>smart</strong><br />

<strong>metering</strong> system is shown in figure 15.<br />

GPRS<br />

E G W<br />

Electricity<br />

Gas<br />

Water<br />

CAS<br />

RADIUS server<br />

GPRS<br />

E G W<br />

Tunnel<br />

GSM<br />

antenna<br />

GGSN<br />

GPRS<br />

E G W<br />

GPRS<br />

Figure 15: GPRS <strong>smart</strong> <strong>metering</strong> implementation<br />

E G W<br />

The GSM security model is considered as broken, because <strong>of</strong> weaknesses found in the A5 stream<br />

encryption algorithms that GSM utilizes [57]. The GPRS system uses a new implementation <strong>of</strong> the<br />

A5 stream encryption which should improve the security <strong>of</strong> the network. Currently, decryption<br />

<strong>of</strong> wireless GPRS signals is not feasible, but could be in the future when details <strong>of</strong> the new<br />

A5 algorithm becomes publicly available [5]. Therefore it is important that besides the GPRS<br />

encryption, additional end-to-end encryption between the meter and back-end system is realized.<br />

Some grid operators use the telecom provider’s APN for their <strong>smart</strong> <strong>metering</strong> <strong>systems</strong> to connect<br />

to, which gives the meter an IP address that could be accessible from the public Internet. Other<br />

operators have their own private APN and RADIUS server which gives the meter an internal IP<br />

address from the grid operator.<br />

Smart <strong>metering</strong> <strong>systems</strong> usually connect only once a day for a small period <strong>of</strong> time to communicate<br />

with the CAS and function only as a client, which makes direct attacks from the public Internet<br />

to a <strong>smart</strong> GPRS meter unlikely.<br />

Attacks on the P3 back-end <strong>systems</strong> could be possible when someone tries to log in to the grid<br />

operator’s private APN using a <strong>smart</strong> meter’s credentials. Therefore it is important that every<br />

meter uses unique and strong credentials to log into the APN. This risk is even bigger when the<br />

grid operator uses the APN <strong>of</strong> the telecom provider which is accessible to all customers <strong>of</strong> the<br />

32

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!