Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems - Multiple Choices
Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems - Multiple Choices
Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems - Multiple Choices
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4.4 Port P3 4 PRACTICAL ANALYSIS<br />
CAS<br />
RF<br />
E G W<br />
Electricity<br />
Gas<br />
Water<br />
GPRS<br />
Internet<br />
RF<br />
E G W<br />
RF<br />
Meshed<br />
Network<br />
RF<br />
E G W<br />
Figure 21: RF <strong>smart</strong> <strong>metering</strong> implementation [22]<br />
RF<br />
E G W<br />
Figure 22: Smart <strong>Dutch</strong> RF module in a Landis+Gyr meter at Delta<br />
to sniff or communicate using GNUradio for example [26]. The security <strong>of</strong> RF depends on the<br />
application layer implementation. With the usage <strong>of</strong> radio transmitter, like GNUradio, one might<br />
be able to disrupt the data link layer protocol and possibly do a denial <strong>of</strong> service. The DC used<br />
in RF solutions have the same security risks as the DC in PLC. The DC will be placed centrally<br />
in neighbourhoods, possibly also at substations and use the same communications technologies as<br />
PLC data concentrators to communicate with the CAS: IP and GPRS.<br />
The DLMS COSEM protocol<br />
DLMS/COSEM is a common language which enables partners in the <strong>metering</strong> industry to communicate<br />
in a standard way, and is defined on the DLMS website as follows: [12]:<br />
38
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