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developmental indices, such as rates of infant mortality, incidence of HIV/Aids, and average life expectancy, as well as self-reported health. The policy mechanisms used to achieve common goals vary in each country, such as whether health care is delivered through private insurance providers versus a national health service, or some mix of the two, but the standardized outcome measures are more comparable across nations. The performance-based indicators are lagged at least a year prior to levels of democratic satisfaction monitored subsequently in the 5th wave World Values Survey. Checks using alternative lags did not substantially alter the interpretation of the results, suggesting that they remain robust irrespective of the particular year selected. Accordingly, following this strategy, Table 7.3 presents the results of the simple correlations across a series of selected macro-level output performance indicators of economic development, human development, and environmental sustainability, as well as survey-based measures of subjective well-being in each society, including life and financial satisfaction, self-reported health and happiness, and a combined subjective well-being index. The results demonstrate that most (but not all) of the macro-level objective indicators usually prove poor predictors of democratic satisfaction. The important exceptions to these patterns concern levels of per capita GDP and the Consumer Price Index, both of which were significantly associated with more positive political attitudes. The measure of the average growth of GDP also proved significant, although in the contrary direction to that expected theoretically; people proved more satisfied with the performance of democracy in countries with lower rates of economic growth, and the results proved robust, whether measured for a single year or the accumulated rates of growth over a five-year period. Nearly all the other standard indicators of economic, social and environmental policy performance, including rates of unemployment, the human development index, and levels of income inequality, were not significantly linked with greater democratic satisfaction. By contrast, the subjective indices in each society were strongly and significantly related to democratic satisfaction, including life satisfaction, self-reported state of health, subjective happiness, financial satisfaction, and the summary subjective well-being index. Thus those who were content with many aspects of their lives were also usually happier about how government works. Accordingly for more rigorous tests, levels of economic development, human development, and the subjective well-being index were entered into the models developed earlier, as shown in Table 7.4. The results in Table 7.4 confirm that economic development and subjective well-being continue to prove important even after controlling for other factors in the models. By contrast, human development appears to have no direct impact upon political orientations. The effects of subjective wellbeing on democratic satisfaction are particularly strong; those who feel happiest, healthiest, well-off and most satisfied with life also prove most content with the way that democratic governance works. The role of subjective well-being has generated a growing popular and scholarly literature in social psychology and economics during the past three decades (see, for example, the literature review in Diener does democrAtIc sAtIsfActIon reflect regIme PerformAnce? / 131
Figure 7.3 Satisfaction with democracy and subjective well-being, 2005-2007 8,0 7,0 6,0 Democratic satisfaction 9,0 5,0 4,0 Eth 5,0 et al. 1999). Studies suggest that this broad syndrome links together many attitudes and feelings, including happiness, as well as satisfaction with life, household finances, work, and family (Helliwell 2003; Inglehart et al. 2008; Eckersley 2009). As illustrated in more detail by Figure 7.3, societies where subjective well-being is highest, including Norway and Switzerland, are also the ones which display the greatest contentment with the democratic performance of their regime. The opposite pattern can be observed in countries such as Ukraine, Russia and Ethiopia. This suggests that subjective well-being is related to contentment with the way that democracy works. The theoretical interpretation of this pattern, however, remains to be determined. If understood primarily as a social psychological and affective phenomenon, reflecting a general feeling of contentment with life, then it could be argued that subjective well-being is part of any comprehensive cultural explanation. From this perspective, some people develop a general sense of well-being, which spills over into norrIs / 132 Mor Bul Gha Viet Uru Jor Swi Spa SAfr Ger Swe Fin Mali Msia Tha Aul Zam Tai Can Jap Arg China Indo Chile Mex SKor Net UK India Fra Cyp Col Tri US Rom Ita Tur Bra BuF Pol Slvn And Mol Serb Iran Rus Ukr 6,0 7,0 Life satisfaction R Sq Linear = 0,343 Note: Democratic satisfaction: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” Standardized to 100-pts. Life satisfaction: Q 22. “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are ‘completely dissatisfied’ and 10 means you are ‘completely satisfied’, where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?” Source: WVS, 2005-2007 Nor 8,0 9,0 . Page 1
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how Democracy works Political Repre
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how Democracy works Political Repre
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Preface / 7 tAble of contents / 5 T
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Preface There are many good reasons
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1 How Democracy Works An Introducti
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tion to the advocates of participat
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democracy has not increased accordi
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is weakest for the model that is do
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citizens do not blindly hold govern
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2 The Dynamics of Political Represe
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tors elected from the district, and
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ship appears ineffective, voters ma
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Previous analyses show that almost
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ernments. Leftist publics generally
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ingly different from the previous f
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mean that when voters do change cou
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or the German SDP under Gerhard Sch
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data are valuable, especially for t
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3 Approaching Perfect Policy Congru
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example, in most countries is const
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y subtracting the percentage of MPs
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. 1977/1979 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 cong
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extremes on the scale are used more
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ole models is simply the increase i
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Table 3.2 Collective policy congrue
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4 Dynamic Representation from Above
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4.2 From opinion to policy A new re
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very idealistic picture of the rela
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Comment: The respondents were asked
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efugees into Sweden or granting Tur
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Figure 4.1 Within-party agreement b
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in the same direction, we speak of
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Inspecting the results for the part
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Figure 4.2 Dynamic opinion represen
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% % % 100 80 60 40 20 0 100 80 60 4
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voters is as high as 81 percent. Th
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as well as among MPs, but most clea
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5 Is Governing Becoming more Conten
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Belgium and the Netherlands, as wel
Page 82 and 83: that the vote for outgoing governme
Page 84 and 85: cent in the period from the 1950s t
Page 86 and 87: The results of a simple over-time t
Page 88: Part II The Citizen Perspective
Page 91 and 92: concluded that this is so because m
Page 93 and 94: This assumption is informed by the
Page 95 and 96: 6.2.2 Why a focus on ‘substantive
Page 97 and 98: on whether respondents prefer democ
Page 99 and 100: Table 6.1 Substantive supply (effec
Page 101 and 102: Sarsfield 2007). Doing so enables o
Page 103 and 104: Figure 6.4 Democratic preferences a
Page 105 and 106: causal mechanism and demonstrate it
Page 107 and 108: intrinsic democratic preferences. B
Page 109 and 110: Table 6.4 Examining the demand acti
Page 111 and 112: Figure 6.7 Expressive actions as a
Page 113 and 114: democracy by depreciating instituti
Page 115 and 116: modeling (Bryk and Raudenbusch 2002
Page 117 and 118: eyond discontent with particular de
Page 119 and 120: ack to autocracy (Zakaria 1997; Car
Page 121 and 122: general, as well as multiple measur
Page 123 and 124: nomic forums. It examines the exten
Page 125 and 126: Figure 7.1 Democratic experience an
Page 127 and 128: faction than any of the other demog
Page 129 and 130: even well-informed and attentive ci
Page 131: Table 7.3 Policy performance indice
Page 135 and 136: outcome and impact of specific gove
Page 138 and 139: 8 Citizens’ Views about Good Loca
Page 140 and 141: sions (Thomassen 1995: 386). In the
Page 142 and 143: 11 that the municipality provides s
Page 144 and 145: importance to three of the four dim
Page 146 and 147: 4 New Kids on the Block (those born
Page 148 and 149: Figure 8.2 An analytical model rega
Page 150 and 151: Table 8.3 OLS regression results fo
Page 152 and 153: Table 8.5 OLS regression results fo
Page 154 and 155: in particular situations inasmuch a
Page 156 and 157: Appendix: Operationalization of var
Page 158 and 159: Political confidence Political conf
Page 160 and 161: 9 Patterns of Party Evaluations Kee
Page 162 and 163: voters in directional theory is not
Page 164 and 165: function of the distance between th
Page 166 and 167: preference curves. For the same sit
Page 168 and 169: est, party support curves will be u
Page 170 and 171: mum occurs where the first derivati
Page 172 and 173: Figure 9.5 Party support curves in
Page 174 and 175: Table 9.2 Elections and the relevan
Page 176 and 177: Table 9.3 Curvature and peaks in pa
Page 178 and 179: Figure 9.8 Party position and linea
Page 180: It appears that no model of party s
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10 The Electoral Consequences of Lo
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ly large parties, and in particular
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form of a predicted value from an e
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if turnout had been at the level of
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Table 10.1 Turnout effects in the 2
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ment/opposition status or party siz
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voters. This very fact might presen
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4 This is demonstrated by many vote
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11 Assessing the Quality of Europea
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view of democracy one would adhere,
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study of political representation i
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logical division between left and r
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One might argue that this measure f
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Figure 11.3 Political parties’ po
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strong Euroskepticism is expressed
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The final factor that we consider i
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wing than oneself and the percentag
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ties that best represent their poli
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tions then become virtually identic
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12 The Impact of the Economic Crisi
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12.2 “I’m doing fine” A first
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Figure 12.3 Satisfaction with econo
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Figure 12.4 Happiness in Germany, 2
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Table 12.1 Changes in satisfaction,
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the feeling of satisfaction with th
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noted. Apparently especially males
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of the economic crisis of the 1970s
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13 The Changing Macro Context of No
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the official name, the Government P
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13.3 Empirical analysis Political b
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in this respect has been clarity of
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welfare issues (Aardal 2003). Indee
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Figure 13.4 Voters’ attitudes tow
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Figure 13.5 The popular support of
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espondents indicated this view, whe
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with two assertions they came up wi
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(Expertise centre for urban affairs
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Welzel, Christian Professor of Poli
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Thomassen, J.J.A., Aarts, C.W.A.M.,
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Thomassen, J.J.A., and Van Deth, J.
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Kickert (Eds.), Governance in Moder
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Aarts, C.W.A.M., and Thomassen, J.J
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Andeweg, R.B., and Thomassen, J.J.A
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Scores for the Dimensions. Vienna:
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J.R. Montero and A. Westholm (Eds.)
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(Eds.), Choosing Europe? The Europe
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Hobolt, S.B., and Klemmensen, R. (2
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Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastru
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Macdonald, S.E., Listhaug, O., and
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Mueller, D.C. (1989). Public Choice
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Powell, G.B. (2009). The ideologica
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Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Eu
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Thomassen, J.J.A. (1983). Relatieve
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Europa im Zeitalter der Entgrenzung
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In How Democracy Works: Political R
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