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ment/opposition status or party size (expressed in proportion of the valid votes at the 2009 EP election). – Turnout effects are significantly related to some of the seven policy dimensions on which parties were scored by coders on the basis of their manifestos: Left/Right (r = -.24, p
Table 10.2 Parties with absolute turnout effects exceeding 2 percent of the valid vote, with some of their characteristics Country Party Name Incumbent Party Size Turnout Left-Right EU- Party? Effect Position Integration Position Austria Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) YES 12.71% -3.0% 8/10 10/10 Bulgaria Coalition for Bulgaria (BSP) NO 18.42% 2.0% 3/10 2/10 Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) NO 31.53% -7.0% 8/10 4/10 National Union Attack (ATAKA) NO 9.01% -2.0% 6/10 8/10 Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) NO 9.00% 2.0% 4/10 2/10 Cyprus Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) YES 34.90% 4.0% 2/10 5/10 Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) NO 9.85% 4.0% 3/10 2/10 Democratic Party (DIKO) YES 12.28% -2.0% 8/10 2/10 Democratic Rally (DISY) YES 35.65% -4.0% 8/10 2/10 Lithuania Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) YES 12.22% -2.0% 8/10 2/10 demonstrates that many of the suggestions that inspection of this table may generate do not stand up when subjected to systematic analysis, and we would expect that, if any regularity exists, it may be related to variables that were not coded in our data, and that are conceivably of a transient nature. One can think of, for example, whether in the period leading up to the election a party has been in the news because of internal conflicts (which might contribute to it being hurt by low turnout), or whether its potential supporters are temporarily much more energized to participate than those of other parties (which may benefit a party under low turnout conditions). But we cannot exclude the possibility that, even if we were to code such characteristics of parties, they would turn out to be equally unimportant to account for the (limited) variance in turnout effects. 10.6 Discussion and concluding remarks In this chapter, we have set out to reconsider the electoral effects of low turnout for a kind of election in which they could matter strongly because electoral participation is particularly low: direct elections to the European Parliament. This kind of ‘low stimulus election’ (Campbell 1960) generally fails to mobilize large numbers of vAn der eIjk / schmItt / sAPIr / 194
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how Democracy works Political Repre
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how Democracy works Political Repre
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Preface / 7 tAble of contents / 5 T
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Preface There are many good reasons
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1 How Democracy Works An Introducti
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tion to the advocates of participat
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democracy has not increased accordi
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is weakest for the model that is do
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citizens do not blindly hold govern
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2 The Dynamics of Political Represe
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tors elected from the district, and
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ship appears ineffective, voters ma
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Previous analyses show that almost
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ernments. Leftist publics generally
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ingly different from the previous f
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mean that when voters do change cou
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or the German SDP under Gerhard Sch
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data are valuable, especially for t
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3 Approaching Perfect Policy Congru
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example, in most countries is const
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y subtracting the percentage of MPs
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. 1977/1979 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 cong
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extremes on the scale are used more
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ole models is simply the increase i
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Table 3.2 Collective policy congrue
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4 Dynamic Representation from Above
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4.2 From opinion to policy A new re
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very idealistic picture of the rela
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Comment: The respondents were asked
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efugees into Sweden or granting Tur
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Figure 4.1 Within-party agreement b
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in the same direction, we speak of
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Inspecting the results for the part
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Figure 4.2 Dynamic opinion represen
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% % % 100 80 60 40 20 0 100 80 60 4
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voters is as high as 81 percent. Th
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as well as among MPs, but most clea
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5 Is Governing Becoming more Conten
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Belgium and the Netherlands, as wel
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that the vote for outgoing governme
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cent in the period from the 1950s t
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The results of a simple over-time t
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Part II The Citizen Perspective
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concluded that this is so because m
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This assumption is informed by the
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6.2.2 Why a focus on ‘substantive
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on whether respondents prefer democ
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Table 6.1 Substantive supply (effec
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Sarsfield 2007). Doing so enables o
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Figure 6.4 Democratic preferences a
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causal mechanism and demonstrate it
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intrinsic democratic preferences. B
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Table 6.4 Examining the demand acti
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Figure 6.7 Expressive actions as a
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democracy by depreciating instituti
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modeling (Bryk and Raudenbusch 2002
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eyond discontent with particular de
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ack to autocracy (Zakaria 1997; Car
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general, as well as multiple measur
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nomic forums. It examines the exten
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Figure 7.1 Democratic experience an
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faction than any of the other demog
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even well-informed and attentive ci
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Table 7.3 Policy performance indice
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Figure 7.3 Satisfaction with democr
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outcome and impact of specific gove
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8 Citizens’ Views about Good Loca
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sions (Thomassen 1995: 386). In the
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11 that the municipality provides s
Page 144 and 145: importance to three of the four dim
Page 146 and 147: 4 New Kids on the Block (those born
Page 148 and 149: Figure 8.2 An analytical model rega
Page 150 and 151: Table 8.3 OLS regression results fo
Page 152 and 153: Table 8.5 OLS regression results fo
Page 154 and 155: in particular situations inasmuch a
Page 156 and 157: Appendix: Operationalization of var
Page 158 and 159: Political confidence Political conf
Page 160 and 161: 9 Patterns of Party Evaluations Kee
Page 162 and 163: voters in directional theory is not
Page 164 and 165: function of the distance between th
Page 166 and 167: preference curves. For the same sit
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Page 172 and 173: Figure 9.5 Party support curves in
Page 174 and 175: Table 9.2 Elections and the relevan
Page 176 and 177: Table 9.3 Curvature and peaks in pa
Page 178 and 179: Figure 9.8 Party position and linea
Page 180: It appears that no model of party s
Page 184 and 185: 10 The Electoral Consequences of Lo
Page 186 and 187: ly large parties, and in particular
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Page 190 and 191: if turnout had been at the level of
Page 192 and 193: Table 10.1 Turnout effects in the 2
Page 196 and 197: voters. This very fact might presen
Page 198 and 199: 4 This is demonstrated by many vote
Page 200 and 201: 11 Assessing the Quality of Europea
Page 202 and 203: view of democracy one would adhere,
Page 204 and 205: study of political representation i
Page 206 and 207: logical division between left and r
Page 208 and 209: One might argue that this measure f
Page 210 and 211: Figure 11.3 Political parties’ po
Page 212 and 213: strong Euroskepticism is expressed
Page 214 and 215: The final factor that we consider i
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Page 218 and 219: ties that best represent their poli
Page 220: tions then become virtually identic
Page 224 and 225: 12 The Impact of the Economic Crisi
Page 226 and 227: 12.2 “I’m doing fine” A first
Page 228 and 229: Figure 12.3 Satisfaction with econo
Page 230 and 231: Figure 12.4 Happiness in Germany, 2
Page 232 and 233: Table 12.1 Changes in satisfaction,
Page 234 and 235: the feeling of satisfaction with th
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Page 238 and 239: of the economic crisis of the 1970s
Page 240 and 241: 13 The Changing Macro Context of No
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13.3 Empirical analysis Political b
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in this respect has been clarity of
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welfare issues (Aardal 2003). Indee
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Figure 13.4 Voters’ attitudes tow
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Figure 13.5 The popular support of
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espondents indicated this view, whe
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with two assertions they came up wi
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(Expertise centre for urban affairs
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Welzel, Christian Professor of Poli
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Thomassen, J.J.A., Aarts, C.W.A.M.,
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Thomassen, J.J.A., and Van Deth, J.
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Kickert (Eds.), Governance in Moder
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Aarts, C.W.A.M., and Thomassen, J.J
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Andeweg, R.B., and Thomassen, J.J.A
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Scores for the Dimensions. Vienna:
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J.R. Montero and A. Westholm (Eds.)
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(Eds.), Choosing Europe? The Europe
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Hobolt, S.B., and Klemmensen, R. (2
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Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastru
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Macdonald, S.E., Listhaug, O., and
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Mueller, D.C. (1989). Public Choice
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Powell, G.B. (2009). The ideologica
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Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Eu
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Thomassen, J.J.A. (1983). Relatieve
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Europa im Zeitalter der Entgrenzung
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In How Democracy Works: Political R
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