- Page 1: how Democracy works Political Repre
- Page 5 and 6: Cover design and layout: Maedium, U
- Page 7 and 8: 9 Patterns of Party Evaluations / 1
- Page 9 and 10: work. We hope that, together, they
- Page 11 and 12: the outburst of popular support for
- Page 13 and 14: able amount of agreement on these k
- Page 15 and 16: of countries across the globe enabl
- Page 17 and 18: tion in the European Union could be
- Page 20: Part I The Basic Principles: Politi
- Page 23 and 24: epresentation and accountability. M
- Page 25 and 26: high correlations between the voter
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- Page 31 and 32: Most analyses of political represen
- Page 33 and 34: sentation. This disconnection betwe
- Page 35 and 36: actions to the citizens who elected
- Page 37 and 38: 5 We gratefully acknowledge access
- Page 39 and 40: Mex Mexico Mol Moldova, Republic Of
- Page 41 and 42: ut are considered to be revealed by
- Page 43 and 44: scientists from various Dutch unive
- Page 45 and 46: is one of the measurement problems
- Page 47 and 48: d. 1998/2001 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 (L)
- Page 49 and 50: also adapted to public opinion, I h
- Page 51 and 52: % Figure 3.2 Collective policy cong
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changed. A more radical solution to
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epresentatives. Surveys are expensi
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elected. The consequence in both ca
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is an excellent case due to data av
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Table 4.2 Policy agreement between
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Consequently, our hypothesis is mos
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ated appeals in order to present po
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A sizeable majority of all opinion
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we find that representation from ab
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% % % 100 80 60 40 20 0 100 80 60 4
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% % % 100 80 60 40 20 0 100 80 60 4
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Figure 4.3 Positions of MPs and vot
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not be underestimated (Nye 2008). P
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thereby approximates much more clos
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5.3 Governing as a dimension of com
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ecome very unpopular electorally, a
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the 1970s, and Luxembourg in the 19
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Notes 1 On the distinction between
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6 Democratic Congruence Re-Establis
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commitments to the freedoms that de
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away by mass opposition late in the
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might push a country’s leaders to
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Figure 6.2 Democratic preferences a
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democratic freedoms to the extent t
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eflect one overarching dimension at
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6.3.5 Establishing statistical inde
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action even in the presence of repr
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democracy stocks. This is obvious f
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25 percent of the cross-national va
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are accounted for by the base level
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nings can be found in the mutually
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7 Does Democratic Satisfaction Refl
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political system at more diffuse Ea
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long-standing democratic states, ca
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The Worldwide Governance Indicators
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Table 7.1 Process performance and d
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Figure 7.2 Good governance and demo
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7.4 Policy performance The results
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are indeed universal standards conc
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developmental indices, such as rate
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Table 7.4 Policy performance and de
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egard, there is indeed a rational b
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the quality of governance in a demo
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ations of the actual performance of
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A next step in the analysis is to m
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(“Yes, thanks, both milk and hone
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especially on the aggregate level,
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Table 8.2 OLS regression results fo
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Table 8.4 OLS regression results fo
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A final observation to be made is t
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7 This value pluralism regarding co
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Education Set of three dummy variab
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Good local government indices dente
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Committee. His contributions, as al
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efer to the political convictions o
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parties that are closer to the neut
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Figure 9.3 Party support curves und
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(3) Evaluation = b 0 + b 1 (Ideolog
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party into power, after a close rac
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tribute to the explanation of party
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Figure 9.7 Party support curves in
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9.7.3 Slope, curvature, and party p
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also larger in the absolute sense w
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Part III Political Representation i
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upon the latter that we focus in th
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a great deal, no matter what method
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The proportion of non-voters in the
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We see here in dramatic clarity the
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are elected, turnout effects exceed
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Table 10.2 Parties with absolute tu
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are so insignificant while in princ
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10, so that the actual threshold is
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The lack of electoral competition o
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makes it difficult for parties to f
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media during the election campaign.
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(H3) The smaller the choice set of
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Figure 11.1 Citizens’ ideological
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mated on the same scale as voter po
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Figure 11.4 Percentage of voters wh
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Table 11.1 Percentage of voters who
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introduced the concept of voting co
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shows overlap with the European int
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Part Iv The Impact of the Economic
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ing industry” (Copenhagen Post),
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Figure 12.1 Satisfaction and happin
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crisis’ was elected by the German
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12.3 At the rock bottom of the cris
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pooled data considerable cross-nati
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Table 12.2 Determinants of satisfac
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for the micro-level analyses presen
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10 Very similar results have been r
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can be compared only to Switzerland
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Table 13.1 Forecast for the size of
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hand. By contrast, we can detect vi
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tive developments. Instead, as Figu
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195) in their analysis of the elect
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the oil income did not by itself ex
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Progress Party regained some of its
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Norway has attempted to regulate an
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List of Contributors Aardal, Bernt
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Narud, Hanne Marthe Professor of Po
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A.1 Books Appendix: Publications by
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Thomassen, J.J.A. (1977). Opvatting
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Thomassen, J., and Schmitt, H. (199
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Andeweg, R.B., and Thomassen, J. (2
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References Aalberg, T. (2001). Norw
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Blais, A., and Bodet, M.A. (2006).
- Page 274 and 275:
Dalton, R.J. (1996). Citizen Politi
- Page 276 and 277:
Enelow, J.M., and Hinich, M.J. (198
- Page 278 and 279:
Gurr, T.R. (1974). Persistence and
- Page 280 and 281:
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture Shift
- Page 282 and 283:
Lau, R.R., and Redlawsk, D.P. (1997
- Page 284 and 285:
Marsh, M. (1998). Testing the secon
- Page 286 and 287:
Opp, K.D. (1994). Repression and re
- Page 288 and 289:
Roller, E. (2005). The Performance
- Page 290 and 291:
Sniderman, P.M., Brody, R.A., and T
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Thomassen, J., and Schmitt, H. (199
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Welzel, C., and Inglehart, R. (2008