ICEM11 Final Program 9.7.11pm_ICEM07 Final Program ... - Events

Abstracts Session 54
5) SECURING OF THE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORED ON GREMIKHA SITE - THE
FORMER SOVIET SUBMARINE BASE IN NORTH-WEST OF RUSSIA (w/oP-59371)
Alexandre Gorbatchev, CEA; Lucien Pillette-Cousin, AREVA TA: Boris Stepennov, NRC KI;
Valery Eremenko, SevRAO; Anatoly Zakharchev, ROSATOM (France/Russia)
In the framework of the G8 Global Partnership the French Commission on Atomic Energy (CEA) is in charge of the French
funded projects aimed to secure the materials susceptible to be a subject of the proliferation or a malicious use. The securing of the
Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) from the former soviet submarines is of a special importance for CEA and the Russian Rosatom. Our
main bilateral project has focused on two kinds of the SNF (alpha cores and VVR assemblies) stored at Gremikha, the former submarine
base in the North-West of Russia. As of 2011 a significant results have been achieved: 2/3 of VVR type assemblies have
been removed from Gremikha and reprocessed at PO Mayak. Nine alpha cores are unloaded and stored on at Gremikha. The main
task now is to prepare the removal from Gremikha of all the remaining SNF and also to set up the needed infrastructure at the sites
where this SNF will be moved. Substantial funding and technical assistance both from France and Russia will be required for that.
Beyond the operator of the Gremikha site (SevRAO), the CEA and Rosatom involve many expert organizations from both countries
such as AREVA, Kurchatov Institute and many others. Their contribution is one of the key elements of the success.
SESSION 54 — GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT - PART 2 OF 2 (5.20)
1) ENVIRONMENTAL AND RADIOLOGICAL REMEDIATION UNDER CANADA’S
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 2004-11 (wP - 59185)
Michael J. Washer, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (Canada)
Following the 911 attack on the USA in 2001 the international community under Canadas G8 leadership established a $20 billion
Global Partnership initiative in 2002 to collaboratively address threats to global security posed by the proliferation and potential
terrorist use of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMMD) and related materials and knowledge. This major international
initiative addressed four priority areas (1) Chemical Weapon Destruction (2) Nuclear powered submarine eliminations (3)
Nuclear and radiological security; and (4) Employment for former weapon scientists. Additionally the Global Partnership initiative
has addressed Biological Non-Proliferation. Canadas execution of all these program areas has resulted in substantial environmental
benefits aside from the eradication and securing of WMMD. This paper will review specific environmental and radiological
remediation achievements of all Global Partnership program areas addressed under Canadian funding 2004 through 2011.
2) UK CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DECOMMISSIONING OF THE BN-350
REACTOR IN KAZAKHSTAN: 2002 – 2011 (wP-59099)
Steven Laws, Department of Energy and Climate Change (UK), David Wells and Andrew Herrick, Nuvia Limited (UK)
Since 2002, the UKs Global Threat Reduction Programme managed by the Department of Energy and Climate Change has provided
assistance to the Republic of Kazakhstan with the decommissioning of the BN-350 sodium cooled fast reactor. Assistance
has focused on non-proliferation, safety and security projects to ensure the permanent and irreversible shutdown of the reactor and
the reduction of security, safety and environmental hazards, particularly those associated with the large inventory of liquid metal
coolants (sodium and sodium-potassium alloy) and the presence of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). UK assistance efforts have been coordinated
with those of the USA and have made use of the UKs experience in decommissioning its own fast reactor power stations,
the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) and the Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR).
The paper describes work undertaken with UK technical and funding assistance support in the following areas:
• Provision of training and technical support in project management and technical topics, including assistance with finalisation
of the BN-350 Decommissioning Plan.
• Liquid metal coolant treatment projects, including immobilisation of liquid products from the Sodium Processing Facility
and processing of residual sodium remaining within the drained coolant circuits.
• Immobilisation of highly active caesium traps, arising from sodium clean-up both during reactor operations and post-shutdown.
• Operations to transfer the entire inventory of spent nuclear fuel from the reactor storage pond into dual-use storage and
transport casks and then consign these casks to long-term secure storage remote from the reactor site. This activity was
part of the major US-Kazakhstan SNF Storage Project.
• Surveys of spent fuel route facilities to establish the absence of any significant amount of nuclear material.
3) DISMANTLING OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWERED FLEET TECHNICAL
SUPPORT VESSELS. ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS (wP-59386)
Konstantin Kulikov, Rinat Nizamutdinov, NIPTB Onega OAO (Russia)
At the present time six nuclear technical support ships are under supervision of Atomflot FGUP. Two of them (Volodarsky
FTB and Lepse FTB) were decommissioned and are berthing. One more ship Lotta FTB should be decommissioned during next
two years.
The nuclear technological support ships carrying SNF and radwastes appear to be a possible radiation contamination of Murmansk
region and Kola Bay because the Ship long-term storage afloat has the negative effect on hull’s structures technical condition.
As a result of this in the context of the Federal Program Nuclear and Radiation Safety (2008-2015) NIPTB Onega was engaged
by state corporation Rosatom to develop the dismantling procedure for Volodarsky FTB and Lotta FTB.
Developing of nuclear technological support ships dismantling projects the technical and economic assessment of dismantling
was carried out. The following variants were examined: formation of SRW module for long-term storage at Saida Bay; complete
dismantlement and allocation of all generated SRW into certified protective containers. The report contains description of variants,
research procedure, comparative analysis of variants of dismantling of nuclear technological support ships with dismantling of
nuclear submarine and propositions concerning further research of specified problem.
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