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PILOTS, MAN YOUR PLANES
A Commander's Notebook for VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC
By Robert D. Harmon
For a game as simplified in concept as
VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC-no minor achieve-
ment given its scope-it offers an amazing variety
of strategies to its players. This has caused some
controversy in past GENERALS (beginning with
Vol. 14, No. 4), for suggested strategies have been
many.
The rules, and format, are deceptively simple.
A game that involves a hundred-odd ships, each
capable of reaching across half the board, will not
be as simple when strategy is considered.
The rules have been simplified to the point
where decision-making, not mechanical com-
plexity, is the order of the day. Thus, your conduct
of VITP will be an exercise in common
sense-what you do, rather than how.
The format of this article addresses VITP thus.
True to the "Commander's Notebook" pattern
which I have used in the past, the game is addressed
piecemeal as individual events or components are
examined in the Critical Issues chapters. Each
Critical Issue is, then, a bite-sized piece of VITP,
for any article trying to present all possible
strategies could very well be unpalatable.
CRITICAL ISSUE #1: Climb Mt. Nitaka
The Pearl Harbor Raid Force is potentially the
largest (and certainly the most important) entity on
Turn One. Certainly, the Imperial Japanese Navy
(IJN, for short) will find that Raid Force organiza-
tion will affect all first-turn strategy. Usually, the
rest of the board gets what's left.
Two general factors in IJN first-turn strategy:
First, this turn must give the IJN a head start
on attrition, taking advantage of Allied
vulnerability;
Second, the IJN should stake out as much
territory as it can, while Allied ships are still
restricted.
A third factor-points of control, or POC-is
considered only indirectly on Turn One. The IJN
won't be able to reach the board-edge areas that
turn. But, the main consideration is long term
POC, and the surviving Allied fleet will determine
how many POC they can defend.
Thus, objectives for the Raid Force:
1. Maximize damage to US ships at Pearl
Harbor.
2. Guarantee IJN staying power in Hawaiian
waters in order to follow up the raid.
3. Go the historical raid one better by sinking
any US carriers offering battle, day or night.
Simple enough, in theory. However, enforcing
the first objective requires the six biggest IJN
carriers. Achievement of the second and third ob-
jectives will also require a substantial surface fleet.
The appearance of one or two US task forces,
combined with the Hawaiian Islands patrol and
the raid survivors, will mean that the Raid Force
could face ten US cruisers, plus one or more
battleships.
The strike on Battleship Row could suffer bad
luck; this must be allowed for, in a game with this
much dice rolling. The surviving American
battleships could seek revenge in conjunction with
the carriers, a factor of chance rather than IJN
stratem.
such luck can be nullified if the Raid Force has
enough strength to face a day or night battle, with
equal forces or better. Such a Raid Force will have
to include the six biggest IJN carriers, which are
needed to maximize the strike and deal with the US
carrier threat. Such a Raid Force should also in-
clude the six IJN battlecruisers, the only battle
units able to join the Raid Force, and not less than
ten cruisers.
Such a Raid Force can try to pre-empt more
than the US battle line. The IJN can well afford an
even exchange of carriers on Turn One. The IJN
has six carriers and three light carriers, with two or
more CVs and three CVLs arriving in the next two
turns. The US has to make five carriers (six, if you
count the Wasp on Turn Four) last until the sixth
turn. The US carriers are all large, a disadvantage
in an early 1:l tradeoff.
Finally, if the Raid Force intimidates the US
carriers sufficiently, it can loiter around Hawaii
and launch additional strikes under rule 18.36,
fully amortizing Battleship Row. The US can con-
test this, but 22 IJN airstrike factors and 16 IJN
surface units will find it easier to sink American
ships in the open ocean.
CRITICAL ISSUE #2:
The First Turn Overall
The Raid Force, which ties up most of the IJN,
deals with one point on the map, Pearl Harbor.
What of the rest of the first-turn board?
Allied deployment and movement is limited, of
course. Major Allied forces appear in the Central
Pacific and Indonesia, and these forces can also
face IJN pre-emptive attacks.
Indonesia, or the East Indies, as it was known
then, is the scene of one such surprise attack. Four
IJN land-based air units (LBA) are available here.
Since LBA will be unopposed in the South Pacific
and Marshall Islands areas, one LBA can hold
each down; Allied cruisers can only offer futile
resistance. Four Javanese LBA are left to deal with
Indonesia.
Only one economical strategy exists for
Indonesia: Leave the four IJN LBA to eliminate
the Allies and establish control. Remember that: a)
IJN air superiority in the area will just about
guarantee control, contested only by the US 5th
Air Force; b) the IJN LBA can eliminate the two
British vessels before normal combat begins under
rule 18.5; and c) why give the British a chance to
take some IJN surface units down with them?
Besides, five more Allied cruisers could intervene,
a purely surface threat countered by the purely
aerial LBA.
Then, there is the Central Pacific to consider.
Much controversy has been inspired in this area
due to IJN carrier placement (see the original
Series Replay in Vol. 14, No. 6) and radical
strategies (an article in Vol. 15, No. 2 suggested