18.64MB - View From The Trenches

15, No. 2 and although controversial, represented
an innovative attempt to find new and unexplored
lines of strategy.
The "Air Power" plan was as follows: Soryu,
Hiryu, Ryujo, and Zuiho would be alone in the
Raid Force (since no followup strike would be
possible in the face of US carrier opposition, no
surface escort was assigned). The remaining
carriers were to go to the Central Pacific along
with a surface contingent of at least six cruisers
and the six slow battleships.
The Pearl Harbor raid was to focus on the two
cruisers and the 7th AF, and leave the US carriers
to the I-boat. This left the remainder of the fleet
unmentioned: four battleships, 14 assorted
cruisers, and six LBA units; presumably these
would deal with the remaining five Allied cruisers
and the Indonesia forces.
The rationale? The US battleships in Pearl
aren't much good without LBA and carrier air
factors to back them up, so concentrating on the
7th AF and the carriers is supposedly preferable.
However, despite a 51% chance at the US forces in
the Central Pacific, there is a much greater chance
to hit most of it in Hawaiian waters (if it stays) and
a 100% chance to sink battleships that, although
of little use on their own, could be critical in a
general fleet action.
The plan's advocacy of priority strikes on 7th
AF, San Francisco, and New Orleans, means that
the US, at worst, loses two cruisers and an air unit
(the latter only temporarily). Not a bad trade for
eight battleships. Meanwhile, the IJN carriers go
for fringe units.
The upshot of this plan is that redundant forces
are used in the Central Pacific and elsewhere,
while the advantage of the Pearl Harbor strike is
tossed aside. Worst of all, and the reason that this
plan is cited, is that this plan represents an abject
surrender to Lady Luck. This is reminiscent of the
winner-take-all 2-1 on Tobruk or the Quatre Bras
heights, also sometimes advocated in this
magazine. Such a policy could pay off spec-
tacularly, but places reliance on chance rather than
reasoning power.
And that is the object lesson of "Air Power in
the Pacific," which transcends any one game.
Luck is a two-edged sword-swing it often
enough, and hard enough, and you're apt to cut
your own head off.
CRITICAL ISSUE #6: Turn Two
The second turn sees Allied forces vastly out-
numbered. The Allies do have some advantages,
though, in this first turn of unencumbered move-
ment. Thanks to the turn sequence, the Allied
player need not lose any raiding ships unless
tempted to stand up to superior enemy raid or
patrol forces. Such temptations include a last ditch
defense of Hawaii, Ceylon, or Samoa, at
dangerous risk.
Still, if the Allied player wants to be able to
choose between fighting or running, then Allied
carriers and battleships had better be raiding.
Allied raiders move last and, although not able to
gain POC, can pounce on weak IJN forces and
affect the general course of play. Attrition is of
paramount importance, as Allied strength, or lack
of it, will determine IJN gains, as much by in-
timidation as by force.
A deadly stratagem in early IJN moves is to
make the American player feel compelled to stand
up for a critical area (Hawaii or the US Mandate,
among others), or worse, divide US forces. US
players take warning: That is precisely what the
enemy wants. A particularly nasty example is Alan
Moon's "TKO" strategy (Vol. 17, No. 4), which
envisioned US forces compelled to make a gallant,
and futile, last stand at Hawaii or Samoa.
CHART I. THREE OPENINGS
3. Marine deployment optional unless specified.
Ed O'Connor's "Maniacal Approach" (Vol.
17, No. 6), rebutted "TKO"; no additional com-
ments on tactics are necessary. Still, the main,
diabolical theme of "TKO" and other IJN
strategies remains: Compelling the Allies to defend
that which cannot be defended. The only answer is
to stay out of harm's way and not play on the
enemy's terms.
If the IJN wants geography, they will have it
during the early turns, like it or not. The Allied
player should mass what little force is available,
building around the five US carriers, and wait for
an opportunity. Such an opportunity, involving a
massed US raid on part of the IJN, will be worth-
while only if the US is strong enough to inflict
heavier losses than it takes.
Above all else, remember that the turn
sequence usually allows the Allied player to fight
where he chooses, and not where it suits the
enemy.
Three ports are critical on Turn Two. Truk, of
course, is adjacent to three areas at once, and dead
center on the board. Truk is a central position
dominating scattered Allied enclaves all around the
board-edge, compensating the IJN somewhat for
its turn sequence disadvantage. Whether operating
as scattered forces, or en masse, the IJN should
base almost exclusively at Truk.
Australia can serve as an excellent US base,
and as an alternative to a threatened Pearl Harbor.
The main advantage: If the IJN can be pushed out
of Indonesia, Australia can be the springboard for
the US part of the effort. Loss of IJN control in
Indonesia means that, besides a major loss of
POC, the IJN siege of Singapore is broken. The
relief of Singapore in turn can allow the Royal
Navy a forward base.
Further, Australia can provide a better base for
American battleships. Slow as they are, US battle
units can raid Indonesia or the South Pacific from
Australia. Rather than basing at Pearl, among less
lucrative areas, Australia puts the US battle line
squarely into the fight, able to contest large POC
areas with the Tokyo Express.
Samoa may serve as an alternative US base, if
the US has to withdraw from Pearl on Turn One.
Ships based in Samoa can reach the Hawaiian
Islands and the Coral Sea easily. Australia is still
preferable for combined operations with the
British-especially for defending Ceylon-but
carrier task forces in Samoa can reach all the way
from Ceylon to the North and Central Pacific. A
One 1-0-7
Marianas Japanese Aleutian
Two 4-4-4 Tw
massed force of five carriers and 15 cruisers on
raid status can be kept as a dangled threat to every
IJN probe, forcing a narrowing of the enemy
effort, and only control of the the US Mandate
could enable the IJN to hamper this which, in
turn, would only cause the US to base elsewhere.
Some Allied tactics for Turn Two, and after-
ward:
1. Avoid battle unless locally superior. A
strong force can crush a small one with little loss,
but an even fight will cost the US more than it can
afford. A few CVs and their cruiser escort must
last till Turn Five.
2. Raid into enemy territory where possible.
Go where the main IJN fleet isn't, and cut into
their POC. It will do the IJN little good to raid the
US Mandate if US ships are visiting the South
Pacific or the Marshalls. Be prepared to take on
LBA, if you're so inclined, with lopsided air
superiority on the order of 4:l or better.
3. Put US LBA units in the danger spots:
Coral Sea, the Mandate, Hawaii, wherever raiding
IJN carriers are likely to go. For control of US rear
areas, LBA units are preferable to surface patrols.
LBA can be replaced, and can take out enemy
carriers; surface ships usually can't do either.
4. Start levering the IJN out of forward areas,
using the Marines. Crucial bases like Guadalcanal,
Midway, Lae, and Dutch Harbor can prove impor-
tant once US LBA units become available.
This Critical Issue is somewhat general. Any
strategy cannot take the enemy for granted, and
only general maxims can be used. The Allied
player must live through the first four turns by
flexibility and resourceful use of what few assets
are at hand.
As for strategy late in the game, after the tide
has turned: The course of play for the entire game
will be determined by the first two or three turns.
CRITICAL ISSUE #7:
The Pearl Harbor Gambit
SAN FRANCISCO (AP1)-The surrender of U.S.
forces on the embattled island of Oahu was announced
today by their commander, Maj. Gen. Robert L.
Eichelberger, in a radio broadcast monitored here.
Gen. Eichelberger, who replaced Gen. Douglas
MacArthur after the latter's escape in July, called upon
US forces still holding out in the Hawaiian Islands to halt
further resistance.
The surrender ceremony, transmitted from Adm.
Yamamoto's headquarters in Honolulu, marks the end of
an epic nine-month naval siege.