Band I/ 2013 (6,7mb) - critica – zeitschrift für philosophie ...

49 CRITICA–ZPK I | 13
up or implies, Durkheim, though, never expressly
purports) then the concept must collapse because
the complementary agents of consciousness fall
apart and subjective consciousness would possess
a real opportunity to retain and be absolutely for
itself. To the contrary, when consciousness has the
capability to collect several, innumerous individuals
in order to share immediately, without the help
of language or other additional signs they may be
coded or not, a common and focussed experience
that may include the exhibition of a special affect,
a drama and intercourse relying upon, then
consciousness should (i) be interconnected from
the beginning (i.e. by nature, properly as its first
‘innatum’ or inborn essence, contrary to the eventual
ideas, and probably even more than only to
hundred percent in the sense of an ‘accomplished’
manifest token at a given time, so that it both has
to provide insight into the very root and the general
condition of consciousness as well); and (ii)
should virtually exist as one real, connected entity
without entailing any natural gap, lacuna or interruption
ever, unless representation, personal abstraction
and interference, proper reflection is responsible
for, focussing the self at the same time;
this altogether against (iii) any presumption that
the same individuals come together, then stick to
their consciousness in order to connect and weave
it all over (still in the primordial, constitutive
sense) allowing the common affect to be shared
– which would be a mechanical-like description
without any substantial understanding of polarity
and the real energy consciousness must consume
and consummate.
To the extent, concerning the meaning of music,
of collective emotion and even consciousness, one
part has been introduced that is depending upon
actual exhibition or a rehearsal. Furthermore, it
may be the case that it is very well exhibiting the
expression of a peculiar subject, singing on the
stage, whereby the whole audience is attuned to it
and assembled by one common emotion, its perception
and adhering representations. The very
question, however, is whether that same expression
should not be and perform the expression of
a community, of a subjectivity that is collective in order
to convey its essence from this peculiar point of view. On
a large scale of historical points of possible liaison
(beginning with the concept of the author’s refusal
to make himself manifest; then passing over to
music history and the upcoming of the monody
and the concerto principle, where the individualistic
standpoint in contrast to and interference
with the tutti is obligatory), three authors from
the nineteenth century seem especially worth
to be cited – (i) Schopenhauer, (ii) Wagner, and
(iii) Goethe, authors well known in their opinion
which now may be read and construed from another
side. The final light will be cast on Goethe’s
relationship to music where the main effort is to
understand how it comprises fusion, or not, which
might also be understood as comprehensing the
translation of a poem or even a theatre play into
music, musical expression.
1. Beginning with Schopenhauer, he purported
that “die Musik ist nämlich eine so unmittelbare
Objektivation und Abbild des ganzen Willens, wie
die Welt selbst es ist, ja wie die Ideen es sind, deren
vielfältige Erscheinung die Welt der einzelnen
Dinge ausmacht. Die Musik ist also keineswegs,
gleich den anderen Künsten, das Abbild der Ideen;
sondern Abbild des Willens selbst, dessen Objektität
auch die Ideen sind: deshalb ist eben die
Wirkung der Musik so sehr viel mächtiger und eindringlicher,
als die der anderen Künste: denn diese
reden nur vom Schatten, sie aber vom Wesen.“ 25
There is no mention of consciousness, even not of
collective consciousness in this famous passage.
Nevertheless, it is closely related, as soon as one
investigates into the underlying relation of individuality
and its counterpart which, still not subject
to the principium individuationis, Schopenhauer
always names the “Wesen” or original will. As it is
not transferred into particularization and expression
by the ideas (well in the Platonic sense) it still
must comprise a peculiar interconnectedness, an
intermediate interwoveness, specific density and
fusion, relying upon the entire, still non-separated
entity (standing, except of Spinoza, totally in opposition
to the concept of substance holding this
25 Artur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung. In: Sämtliche Werke. Textkritisch
bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Wolfgang Frhr. Von
Löhneisen. Band I, Frankfurt 1968, p.359.