1985-1986 Rothberg Yearbook

Palestinian
M isrepresentation
When considering the desire of many Palestinians to
have a sovereign state it is necessary to separate the hopes
of a budding political entity from the political extortionists
of the PLO. The barbaric terrorist attacks perpetrated by
the PLO do not originate in the small Arab villages in
Israel; rather, they come from a mish-mash of political
confusion. I assert Habash, Abbu Abas, Abu Nidal,
Ahmed Jabril, and Yasar Arafat all claim to champion the
Palestinian cause, yet they have hurt and not helped the
Palestinian effort.
To begin with, the PLO is splintered into almost
countless factions, thereby nullifying the effectiveness of
any one leader. In addition, their methods of terrorism
and anti-Israel rhetoric make their political stance weaker,
not stronger. These radical actions illustrate a haphazard
rather than cohesive organization.
The expulsion of the PLO entity from Jordan in 1970
is a glaring example of a split in Arab politics caused
by the PLO. In addition, terrorism coupled with the
rejection of Israel’s right to exist, vis-a-vis rejection of
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 292 and 338, make it
impossible to hold negotiations with the PLO.
To make matters more complicated, the Lebanon War
in 1982 produced documents that directly connected the
Soviet Union to the PLO. Diplomas for weapons,
documents for espionage, and terrorist training were
found, in addition to a transcript of a conversation
between Yasar Arafat and Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko
from a meeting in Moscow were found. The Soviets’
policy has been to support organizations that undermine
the stability of non-communist societies. Therefore, the
PLO-Soviet relationship makes the political disposition of
the PLO less likely for compromise if not totally opposed
to any solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In addition to the Soviet involvement, terrorism has
evolved into a lucrative business proposition and has also
expanded to include western targets. These factors show
that the PLO isnot solely concerned with forming a
Palestinian homeland, rather, they are interested in
advancing their political influence and ensuring their
well-being.
It is clear that the political viability of the PLO is not
acceptable in the Arab-Israeli theater. The energy required
to form a Palestinian State, therefore, can not eminate
from the PLO. Rather, the formation o f a state will come
out of work from towns like Baqa, a small Arab village
outside of Hadera. These people have resolved to
modernize their town. In contrast to the popular image
of mud-brick houses and open sewars, Baq is a modem
town in anyone’s terms. There are many new homes and
most families have cars, in many cases more than one.
The people are proud of their advancement. Undoubtedly,
they have the resourcefulness to build and run a modern
community.
They also have a deep sense of political commitment.
They expressed a desire to have a nation side by side with
Israel. But, the power vested in the leadership must come
from the Palestinians, and not the Israeli. This would give
the leadership credibility in the eyes of the Palestinians.
The problem is that the PLO dominates Palestinian
leadership circles and prevents more moderate leaders
from rising. Several people told me they would fear for
their lives if they accepted positions of power from Israel.
What I learned is that the Palestinians do have solid,
reasonable leadership capabilities themselves. They do
not need the PLO, nor do they want to take responsibility
for the PLO’s terrorist actions. From our western
oriented perspective it is important to differentiate
between these two camps: the PLO and the Palestinian
cause. They are not the same. We need to see through the
slanted veil of western media and realize there is a people
that have legitimate leadership and a legitimate right to a
sovereign nation.
John Helgeson