Rural Income Generation and Diversification - A Case Study ... - Doria
Rural Income Generation and Diversification - A Case Study ... - Doria
Rural Income Generation and Diversification - A Case Study ... - Doria
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22<br />
1992 consumer <strong>and</strong> transportation prices liberalised but minimum maize producer<br />
price remained<br />
principal marketing agents appointed<br />
a severe drought in Zambia<br />
1993 termination of maize transport subsidies<br />
20 % tariff on wheat imports<br />
minimum maize producer prices set<br />
increasing interest rates due to liberalisation of financial markets →<br />
slow emergence of private trade → government interventions continued<br />
high inflation → real producer prices decreased<br />
1994 export ban on maize <strong>and</strong> maize meal<br />
minimum maize prices abolished<br />
privatisation of oil mills, National Milling Company, cotton, sugar <strong>and</strong><br />
milk industries 1994-1996<br />
1995 ZCF's bankruptcy<br />
Food Reserve Agency (FRA) established → underpriced state sales of<br />
fertilisers<br />
Zambia joined WTO<br />
1996 agricultural sector investment programme initiated<br />
partial removal of binding export restrictions<br />
1997 FRA distributes fertilisers on credit<br />
government states: liberalisation accomplished, but direct <strong>and</strong> indirect<br />
interventions still continue, e.g. high inflation, interest rates <strong>and</strong> exchange<br />
rates, also heavy taxation on agricultural producers<br />
1998 FRA importing maize<br />
privatisation of seed <strong>and</strong> fertiliser industries<br />
1999 preparation of a new National Agricultural Policy<br />
government contracts private firms to distribute fertilisers<br />
2001 severe drought<br />
2002 50 % subsidy on fertilisers<br />
free input delivery to the poorest<br />
Sources: Wood <strong>and</strong> Schula(1987), Mickels-Kokwe (1997), Wichern et al. (1999), Jayne et al. (2002)<br />
Seshamani (1998) aptly described the situation of a smallholder farmer after the reforms:<br />
The main victim of the inadequate national response from private agents has been the<br />
small farmer. While he waited for his produce to be collected (information regarding<br />
policy changes not having seeped through to him), it was mostly not collected. Since<br />
there had been guaranteed <strong>and</strong> prompt state collection earlier, he had not set up any<br />
storage facilities. The lack of storage facilities now made him desperate. His<br />
desperation was aggravated by his enhanced cash requirements since, with the<br />
introduction of user charges in health <strong>and</strong> education, he had to make allocations to<br />
school <strong>and</strong> health fees, which he never did before. Also, since the agents did not<br />
come to him to purchase his produce, he had to go to the market centres to sell them.