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Rural Income Generation and Diversification - A Case Study ... - Doria

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imports for subsidised distribution declined from over 100,000 metric tonnes (mt) in the<br />

early 1990s to 40,000 mts at the end of the decade (Govereh et al. 2002), although in<br />

1999/2000 about 35 per cent of the fertiliser received by smallholder farmers still came<br />

under the government loan programme. The repayment rate was as low as 38 per cent (ibid.),<br />

the losses being covered from the state budget.<br />

Fertiliser use fluctuated significantly during the 1990s. It peaked at 164,927 mt in 1993/94,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the following growing season witnessed figures as low as 64,525 mt (MAFF 2001a).<br />

During the 1999/2000 season only 20 per cent of smallholders used fertiliser (Govereh et al.<br />

2002). The government distribution programmes presented the smallholders with the<br />

dilemma of whether to pay the full price in cash to a private trader or to take a risk <strong>and</strong> wait<br />

for the arrival of government-subsidised fertiliser. This often led to late planting <strong>and</strong><br />

fertiliser application as well as to insecurity among the private operators (ibid.).<br />

Following the drought that occurred during the 2001/02 growing season the government<br />

introduced a price-subsidy system aiming at increasing the use of fertiliser. The cost of the<br />

50 per cent price subsidy was covered from the state budget. The system has been in place<br />

ever since, although many problems were encountered during its implementation: coverage<br />

was limited, farmers received their fertiliser late, <strong>and</strong> mismanagement was reported. 7<br />

During the 2002/03 season the government was thus fully involved in fertiliser marketing,<br />

distribution <strong>and</strong> price subsidising, <strong>and</strong> in 2006 maize price support <strong>and</strong> fertiliser subsidies<br />

took almost 80 per cent of the agricultural budget allocated to poverty-reduction programmes<br />

(Govereh et al. 2006). Fertilisers <strong>and</strong> seeds were also distributed free of charge to the most<br />

vulnerable households by non-governmental organisations such as the Programme Against<br />

Malnutrition 8 .<br />

The government fertiliser-subsidy programme operated through re-established cooperatives.<br />

To access the subsidised fertiliser, farmers were expected to join the cooperatives, which<br />

quickly became politicised <strong>and</strong> the distribution system non-transparent. This left many<br />

farmers with access difficulties. 9<br />

Before the reforms the seed sector was monopolised by Zamseed, which was privatised in<br />

the late 1990s (Wichern et al. 1999). As a consequence, smallholders started facing problems<br />

with the availability of good-quality seed, especially in remote areas where the dem<strong>and</strong> was<br />

not high enough to attract private suppliers. The use of hybrid maize varieties declined<br />

compared to traditional <strong>and</strong> open-pollinated varieties because of the seed-availability<br />

problem, as well as the higher fertiliser requirement. MAFF (2001a) reported a decline in the<br />

use of certified maize seed from 5,101 mt in 1996 to 3,805 mt in 1999. For cash crops such<br />

7<br />

Interviews conducted in Eastern Province <strong>and</strong> Lusaka, 2003.<br />

8<br />

Interviews conducted in Lusaka, 2003.<br />

9<br />

Interviews (agricultural extension staff) conducted in Eastern Province, 2003.<br />

29

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