Journal of Technical Analysis - Market Technicians Association

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The Boundaries of Technical Analysis Milton W. Berg, CFA Market Prognostication 1 In his treatise on stock market patterns, the late Professor Harry V. Roberts 1 observed that “of all economic time series, the history of stock prices, both individual and aggregate, has probably been most widely and intensively studied,” and “patterns of technical analysis may be little if nothing more than a statistical artifact.” 2 Ibbotson and Sinquefield maintain that historical stock price data cannot be used to predict daily, weekly or monthly percent changes in the market averages. However, they do claim the ability to predict in advance the probability that the market will move between +X% and -Y% over a specific period. 3 Only to this very limited extent – forecasting the probabilities of return – can historical stock price movements be considered indicative of future price movements. In Chart 1, we present a histogram of the five-day rate of change (ROC) in the S&P 500 since 1928. The five-day ROC of stock prices has ranged from -27% to + 24%. This normal distribution 4 is strong evidence that five-day changes in stock prices are effectively random. Out of 21,165 observations of five-day ROCs, there have been 138 declines exceeding -8%, (0.65% of total) and 150 gains greater than +8% (0.71% of total). Accordingly, Ibbotson and Sinquefield would maintain that over any given 5-day period, the probability of the S&P 500 gaining or losing 8% or more is 1.36%. Stated differently, the probabilities of the S&P 500 returning between -7.99% and +7.99% are 98.64%. Professor Jeremy Siegel adopts this idea. Siegel states, “The total return on equities dominates all other assets.” 5 Based on probabilities, we can be nearly certain that over the long-term, stocks will outperform bonds, gold, commodities, inflation, real estate, and other tradable investments. Are these ideas true? Are stock price movements effectively random? Do historical stock market returns indicate probabilities of future returns? Can statistical analysis tell us that the equities market will continue to outperform all other assets? Can stock market data never indicate that over a given period of time the market will increase at a rate greater than its historical gain? Can stock market data never point toward the probability of a decline overwhelming the probability of a rally? 1 Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago 1949-1992 Chart 1 2 The Journal of Finance, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Mar., 1959), Roberts does admit that “phenomena that can be only described as chance today,” such as the behavior of stock prices and the emission of alpha particles in radioactive decay, “may ultimately be understood in a deeper sense.” 3 Stocks, Bonds, etc: 1989 edition. Ibbotson & Sinquefield Ch. 10 4 The true normal distribution is a mathematical abstraction, never perfectly observed in nature 5 Stocks for the Long Run, J. Siegel Jo u r n a l of Technical Analysis • 2008 • Issue 65 5
6 Roll of the Dice Let us compare the capital markets to a pair of dice, and the shooting of the double sixes to an investment in the equity market. Let us assume that beginning in the year 1900 only one pair of dice existed and all gamblers played with that dice. Let us assume that the dice were weighted and biased towards the shooting of the double six. Rather than the honest odds of 2.78% for the throwing of the double six, let us assume the odds were 5.00%. It is logical to assume that all those who bet on or against the double six would seek compensation commensurate with the perceived (but inaccurately considered) risk. After a few years however, some gamblers may begin to notice a statistical anomaly. It would seem as if the double six were favored. Those gamblers would seek to adjust to the perceived new reality. As more and more gamblers took notice, and accepted the fact that the dice are inherently biased, they will adjust their betting odds accordingly. Academics are, in fact, comparing the capital markets to those loaded dice. By studying historical market data, they have discovered the true nature of those dice. Ibbotson, Sinquefield, and Siegel can now state with certainty that stocks will outperform bonds and probabilistically return between +X% and -Y% over the next day, week, month or decade. It is not just members of academia who have discovered the positive bias of the stock market. Investors in general seem to compare the market to those inadvertently loaded dice as well. Historically, investors wrongly assumed that buying stocks was a risky endeavor. As compensation for taking that risk, investors in equities • • • • Required a cash yield higher than that of long-term corporate bonds 7 Sought high absolute dividend yields 8 Invested only a small portion of their assets in stock 9 Limited their margin exposure 6 Not yet realizing that the capital markets (dice) were positively biased towards the equity market (double sixes), investors liquidated en masse when dividend yields declined or economic slowdowns materialized. Experiencing decade after decade of stocks outperforming bonds, investors have come to realize that the market compensates for the risks assumed. They no longer require stock yields to be greater than the bond yield. 10 They no longer require a high absolute dividend yield. 11 High long-term exposure to the equity market is common. 12 Investing on margin is an accepted norm. 13 Further confirming the market’s positive bias, the 1987 crash passed with nary an effect, and the 2000-2003 Internet-stock implosion did not destroy well-diversified portfolios. The Dow, small-cap, mid-cap, and emerging markets worldwide continue making new, all-time highs. The wealth-creating machine continues running as expected. Investors know that over the longterm (measured in decades), stocks create wealth. Over the short-term (measured in days, months, and years), stock market direction is unpredictable! Statistics vs. Markets We disagree with the view of the academics, and deem the application of conventional statistical analysis to stock market prices as misguided. Stock market returns and risks cannot be compared to the probable outcomes of the throw of a pair of dice. 14 Nor can a bell-shaped curve generated by historical stock price movements be compared to the bell-shaped curve generated by a Quincunx board. 15 This is because an economic system is not the same as a physical system. In a physical system, predicted outcomes of dice rolls and Quincunx ball drops are true by definition. Trials or historic tests are not required to determine future outcomes. The probabilities of the outcomes are inherent within the nature of the object or system. In economic systems such as the Capital Asset Price Structure of the United States markets, there are no physical objects or material systems to analyze. Historical returns and risks may never be replicable. The structure is in a constant state of unrest. Economies based on capitalism can turn to socialism. Heavily regulated or protected industries can be liberalized. Thriving industries can virtually vanish due to foreign competition. Industries prosperous in a free environment may encounter excessive regulation or nationalization by a socialistically inclined Congress. Tax rates may be raised or lowered. The unit of account itself (the currency) may be recalibrated. The Federal Reserve may mismanage the supply of money and credit, transform mild recessions into deep depressions, or turn normal cyclical recoveries into credit based booms. In short, when measuring the capital markets, particularly the stock market, one is measuring the results of a myriad of factors that may or may not repeat. Unique factors that may affect the markets in the future are not necessarily part of the historic system being measured. Most importantly, statistical analysis of stock prices does not measure any of the various financial statistics of the companies that make up the market. Nor does statistical analysis measure any of the economic and political factors that contribute to the wealth of the nation. All that is actually being measured are the prices that investors are paying for those economic entities. Prices paid for marketable securities are far removed from a physical or natural system suitable to the rigors of statistical dissection. We therefore believe that based on statistical analysis one can only affirm that the stock market may or may not outperform bonds in the future or that stocks may or may not exhibit a long-term rising price trend in the future. We can only know with a certainty that stocks may or may not compensate investors for risk assumed, and we can have no idea where the market will trade one day, one week, one month, one year, or one decade from the present. We plainly disagree with Ibbotson, Sinquefield and Siegel, and do not recognize the ability to predict probabilities of stock market fluctuations. We take note that Nobel Prize winning economists portray the movement of stock prices as a random or drunkard’s walk. 16 Does this understanding of stock price movements mark the futility of technical market analysis? 6From 1871-1938 dividend yields averaged 1.1/4 times bond yields. From 1938-1955 they averaged 2 times the bond yield. Security Analysis, Graham and Dodd 1962 edition page 420 7At the eight market peaks from 1901 to 1929 yields averaged 3.55%. At the 10 market peaks from 1930 to 1956 yields averaged 4.74%. At the 10 market peaks from 1960 to 1984 yields averaged 3.11% At the five market peaks since 1987 yields averaged 1.97% (Ned Davis Research reports 405 and 400) 8NDR charts # S485 and S486. 9Investors have increased margined investments as % of GDP from .43% in 1950 to 2.00% currently. NDR charts 20420 10Bond yields are currently 2.4 times stock yields 11At the five market peaks since 1987, yields averaged 1.97% (Ned Davis Research reports 405 and 400) 12NDR charts # S485 and S486 13Investors have increased margined investments as % of GDP from .43% in 1950 to 2.00% currently. NDR charts 20420 14Paul M. Montgomery Universal Economics Jan 2, 2007 (757-597-9528) 15See http://www.jcu.edu/math/isep/Quincunx/Quincunx.html 16 th William Sharpe, et al. Investments, (6 Ed.) Jo u r n a l of Technical Analysis • 2008 • Issue 65
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