The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
2. Model as Metaphor 9<br />
This study asserts that the <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>communication</strong> is, for most linguists, more<br />
than a simple metaphor. Rather, it is a conceptual metaphor to the extent that it reflects<br />
conceptual organization used by “mature” linguists who employ it and determines<br />
conceptual structuring for linguists “in training” who learn and adopt it. 8 Just as our<br />
everyday conceptual metaphors, such as ILLNESS IS ENEMY, are tacit and can only be<br />
inferred from the actual metaphorisms, so also the <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong> is tacit and can only be<br />
inferred from metaphorisms.<br />
Employing the nomenclature here proposed, one may identify a <strong>code</strong>-<strong>model</strong> based<br />
expression, such as “ideas to be transmitted are represented by a <strong>code</strong>” (Denes and<br />
Pinson 1993:6 [orig. 1963]), as a COMMUNICATION IS CODING EVENT metaphorism.<br />
Depending upon the component <strong>of</strong> the <strong>model</strong> in focus, the <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong> may be said to<br />
reflect other metaphors as well, such as COMMUNICATION IS TRANSMISSION EVENT,<br />
and COMMUNICATION IS DECODING EVENT.<br />
While such nomenclature has become common in metaphor analysis (see Barlow<br />
1994; Lak<strong>of</strong>f and Johnson 1980; Reddy 1979), it is not, however, common in <strong>model</strong><br />
analysis (see Gentner and Stevens 1983). In the more traditional nomenclature <strong>of</strong> <strong>model</strong><br />
analysis, a statement such as “ideas to be transmitted are represented by a <strong>code</strong>,” would<br />
simply be referred to as an appeal to the <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong>. This study will employ metaphoranalysis<br />
nomenclature when addressing more typical conceptual metaphors, such as the<br />
conduit metaphor as an integrated constituent within the <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong>. In addressing <strong>code</strong><strong>model</strong><br />
based statements, however, the study will employ the more traditional <strong>model</strong>analysis<br />
nomenclature, by simply describing <strong>code</strong>-<strong>model</strong> based statements as “appeals”<br />
to the <strong>model</strong>.<br />
Lak<strong>of</strong>f has introduced a useful concept, that <strong>of</strong> functional embodiment, that helps<br />
explain the significance <strong>of</strong> conceptual metaphors. A brief introduction to the idea <strong>of</strong><br />
‘functional embodiment’ is important here, for it contributes to an understanding <strong>of</strong> the<br />
role <strong>of</strong> metaphor in metatheory. Lak<strong>of</strong>f defines the concept as follows:<br />
Functional embodiment: <strong>The</strong> idea that certain concepts are not merely understood intellectually;<br />
rather, they are used automatically, unconsciously, and without noticeable effort as part<br />
<strong>of</strong> normal functioning. Concepts used in this way have a different, and more important, psychological<br />
status than those that are only thought about consciously. (Lak<strong>of</strong>f 1987:12; italics<br />
in original)<br />
8<br />
Readers should also see Norman (1983) and Young (1983), both <strong>of</strong> which discuss mental <strong>model</strong>s, especially Young<br />
(1983:38) discussing strong analogy and surrogate mental <strong>model</strong>s. In some respects, the <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>communication</strong><br />
conforms to the characterization <strong>of</strong> mental <strong>model</strong>s. Norman writes:<br />
Mental <strong>model</strong>s are naturally evolving <strong>model</strong>s. That is, through interaction with a target system, people<br />
formulate mental <strong>model</strong>s <strong>of</strong> that system. <strong>The</strong>se <strong>model</strong>s need not be technically accurate (and usually are<br />
not), but they must be functional. A person, through interaction with the system, will continue to modify<br />
the mental <strong>model</strong> in order to get a workable result. Mental <strong>model</strong>s will be constrained by such things as the<br />
user’s technical background, previous experience with similar systems, and the structure <strong>of</strong> the human<br />
information processing system. (Norman 1983:7–8)