The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
The code model of communication: a powerful - SIL International
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2. Model as Metaphor 23<br />
Communication is the process by which information is transmitted from a source (usually<br />
a person) to a receptor (usually another person, or group <strong>of</strong> people). It requires, therefore, that<br />
the source and the receptor share some knowledge about the <strong>code</strong> being used to transmit the<br />
information, whether that <strong>code</strong> is verbal, visual, or otherwise. (Questionnaire response; March<br />
28, 1998.)<br />
<strong>The</strong>se two responses are in many respects typical <strong>of</strong> the <strong>code</strong>-<strong>model</strong> based responses<br />
provided.<br />
After the survey and initial research for the study had been completed, those portions<br />
were presented as a paper at an academic conference (Blackburn 1998). Specifically, the<br />
presentation covered the history <strong>of</strong> the <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong> and its permeation through linguistics.<br />
Following the session, a fellow presenter commented, “I taught this [<strong>model</strong>] to my<br />
students just last week, but you know, before today, I’d never given any thought to the<br />
<strong>model</strong> or where it came from.”<br />
A third and perhaps even more illuminating type <strong>of</strong> response has <strong>of</strong>ten arisen in the<br />
context <strong>of</strong> personal conversation concerning the study. When colleagues have been<br />
asked, “How do you think <strong>communication</strong> works?” a majority have responded with a<br />
<strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong>-based answer. But if, instead <strong>of</strong> eliciting their description <strong>of</strong> <strong>communication</strong>,<br />
they were given a synopsis <strong>of</strong> the study, many responded with debate. <strong>The</strong> standard<br />
response went something like, “Oh, that’s how we talk about <strong>communication</strong>, but I don’t<br />
think it really has much bearing on how we do linguistics.”<br />
<strong>The</strong>se responses are interesting, but they should not be surprising. <strong>The</strong> <strong>code</strong> <strong>model</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>communication</strong> serves to embody presuppositions, and those presuppositions can indeed<br />
guide the analyses <strong>of</strong> the linguists holding them. Considering the significance <strong>of</strong> the role<br />
thus served, one might expect that the <strong>model</strong> would be well documented and thoroughly<br />
“digested” in discussion. It’s structure has been observed and addressed by a few<br />
theoreticians (Berge 1994; Harris 1981:10–13; Harris 1987:205–208; Harris 1990;<br />
Schiffrin 1994:391–393; Sperber and Wilson 1986:2–6ff.), but more frequently it is<br />
employed in a naïve manner, rarely being explicitly identified or discussed. Instead, it is<br />
assumed a priori, being adopted and incorporated as tacit knowledge. Indeed, some<br />
linguists report that they cannot conceive <strong>of</strong> <strong>communication</strong> operating in any other way<br />
than that spelled out in the <strong>model</strong>.<br />
2.5. Reified metaphor<br />
Consider the following admonition from Eugene Nida’s Presidential Address to the<br />
Annual Meeting <strong>of</strong> the Linguistic Society <strong>of</strong> America in December 1968, wherein he<br />
warns against the tendency to employ <strong>model</strong>s without a keen awareness <strong>of</strong> the metaphors<br />
upon which they depend:<br />
Perhaps part <strong>of</strong> the difficulty in linguistics, as in all branches <strong>of</strong> science, is not having<br />
fully recognized certain inadequacies in our <strong>model</strong>s. Turbayne 1962 has clearly pointed out<br />
the metaphorical nature <strong>of</strong> so-called scientific <strong>model</strong>s. <strong>The</strong>y are essential aids to comprehension,<br />
but they must not be permitted to dictate the nature <strong>of</strong> what they are supposed to<br />
explicate. It is particularly dangerous to employ mechanical <strong>model</strong>s as ways <strong>of</strong> describing the