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Arctic Triumphs and Tragedies
called from Kazan and instructed to show Levanevskiy the airplane.After being
introduced to Levanevskiy, Bolkhovitinov gathered his few remaining compatriots
at Factory No. 22, including me. He was very against the idea of using the
only DB-A that had undergone flight tests for a transpolar flight.When I told
him about the modifications we had made on the TB-3 for the arctic version
and estimated that it would take at least two months, his mood darkened. He
said, “In any event, we will not get the airplane back. And how long will it be
before we have another one?”
Bolkhovitinov also considered Tupolev’s attitude toward the use of the DB-A
for a transpolar flight. Tupolev did not support the idea of the DB-A, period.
From the author’s archives.
Factory No. 22 Chief V. F. Bolkhovitinov (far left), consulting with S. A. Levanevskiy (far right),
August 1937.
Moreover, after the incident at the meeting with Stalin,Tupolev had a very negative
attitude toward Levanevskiy. At that time Tupolev was not only a chief
designer, but was also the acting deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Aviation
Industry within the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Preparation for the
proposed flight was impossible without the aviation industry’s assistance.
Bolkhovitinov had every reason not to agree, but word had it that secret pressure
from the top came from Stalin himself.
In early June, the DB-A developers met for the first time with Levanevskiy at
the factory airfield.At that time I was still unaware of Levanevskiy’s difficult military
biography. Sporting stylish clothes, with a thoughtful and intent gaze, he gave
the impression of a well-bred aristocrat. During preparation for takeoff, he was
very reserved and taciturn. Obviously Bolkhovitinov’s stance pained him.
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