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On the Eve of War
tunity to prove their relevance as weapons by that time.Work on oxygen liquidpropellant
rocket engines, which Tikhonravov was trying to bring back, was not
given the proper support. It should be mentioned that our intelligence services had
no information concerning the scope of work being conducted on liquidpropellant
engines and rockets in Germany.The Germans were building what was
for that time a vast rocket center in Peenemünde. The primary mission of this
center was to develop long-range, liquid-propellant guided rockets.The parameters
of the liquid-propellant rocket engines being developed between 1935 and
1940 at NII-3 could not compare in any way with what the Germans were brandishing
during that time at Peenemünde. Before the war we had ceded leadership
in the development of liquid-propellant guided rockets.
Yet in the area of small, solid-propellant rocket projectiles we were far ahead of
the Germans. This innovation, however, was not put into mass production for
combat use until the onset of war.
High-ranking military leaders—the Deputy People’s Commissars for Defense;
the rapidly changing General Staff Chiefs, B. M. Shaposhnikov, K. A. Meretskov,
and later also G. K. Zhukov; and the People’s Commissar for Defense, S. K.
Timoshenko—did not imagine the tactical capabilities of this new weapon and did
not devise any plans for its use in the future war.
Usually all innovations in the field of weaponry were reported to Stalin. But
Stalin had no information about infantry rocket projectiles before 1941. Artillery
Marshal Kulik, as Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense for Artillery, was responsible
for the activity of the Main Artillery Directorate—for evaluating and accepting
new rocket launcher systems as standard armament. It was his duty to report
personally to Stalin, and if not to him, then to People’s Commissar Timoshenko.
But Kulik had underestimated this new weapon. Aborenkov was completely
convinced of the effectiveness of rocket projectiles from his experience with their
use in aviation. He went over the head of his superior, Marshal Kulik, and reported
this development in a memorandum to Stalin. Aborenkov risked, if not his head,
then certainly his career. One must give him credit for his daring.
In his memoirs, G. K. Zhukov recalls that soon after his appointment as chief of
the General Staff, Stalin asked him if he was familiar with vehicle-mounted rocket
launchers. Zhukov responded that he had only heard of them, but not seen them.
Stalin said,“Well, then one of these days soon you’ll have to go with Timoshenko,
Kulik, and Aborenkov to the firing range and watch them fire.” 7 At that time
Aborenkov was a division chief at GAU. Someone of his rank was not supposed
to have any dealings with Stalin, which makes it all the more interesting that Stalin
knew about him.
I learned how Stalin’s instructions were fulfilled from the stories and notes of
the direct participants in the development and production of Katyushas. One of
7. G. K. Zhukov, Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya (Memoirs and Reflections) (Moscow:Voyenizdat, 1974),Vol. 1.
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