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Rockets and People
attract the most talented people. In doing so, he did not take age into account, and
he was not afraid of competition.
Von Braun had been named technical director of Peenemünde-Ost at the age
of twenty-five! For Germans this was quite unusual. But this shows how highly
they valued his talent, initiative, and rare intuition. According to Gröttrup, von
Braun was very attentive to senior, experienced specialists. He made fundamental
decisions after having first gathered and listened to diverse opinions.There was no
voting; von Braun always had the last word, but he managed not to offend the
other staff. In spite of his youth, his authority was not called into question.
Fifty years after this assessment of von Braun’s management style, I met with an
American engineer named Jerry Clubb, who was a participant in the Apollo-
Saturn lunar program, which had been directed by the no longer twenty-five but
fifty-five-year-old, world-renowned creator of the first long-range ballistic missiles.
The American talked about von Braun’s working style in the United States in the
same way that I had heard Gröttrup describe it in 1945 over a cup of coffee with
whipped cream.
We did not manage to pick up Baron Wernher von Braun through Operation
Ost, and I think that this was good both for us and for him. Despite all of his capabilities,
what he achieved in the United States would have been impossible for him
to achieve in the Soviet Union. It is true, another prominent scientist, professor,
doctor, and also baron, Manfred von Ardenne, who had worked in the Soviet
Union from 1945 to 1955 at the Electrophysics Institute in Sukhumi, was awarded
the title Hero of Socialist Labor for his participation in the creation of the Soviet
atomic bomb. It should be noted, however, that von Ardenne had not been a
member of the Nazi Party, and he had not created weapons of mass destruction
under the Nazis.
Von Braun had been valued and trusted by Dornberger and the higher military
leadership of the infantry forces who had financed the construction of
Peenemünde. He did not have to fear intrigue against himself, and he was able to
work confidently as the technical director. Dornberger, who had become a general
at Peenemünde, had always shielded von Braun.They were a powerful duo.
In spite of various nuances in political views, the main leadership staff had
worked rather harmoniously and very selflessly. Everyone understood that it was
too dangerous to express one’s innermost thoughts.Any conversations concerning
the possibility of using rockets for space travel were also dangerous because the
Gestapo had ears everywhere. Such conversations were viewed as sabotage,
the diversion of efforts from the Führer’s most important assignment.
While we were talking with Gröttrup, the conversation somehow turned to the
forced labor at Mittelwerk and the atrocities that had been carried out there.“What
was your attitude toward the production of missiles using people condemned to
death?” we asked. Immediately Frau Gröttrup interjected. No, she and Helmut had
had no idea that such horrors that were taking place there. She said that this was
also the case with the majority of the specialists. But von Braun and the
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