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Rockets and People<br />
grandiose complexes of the engineering and launch sites of the cosmodromes, were<br />
all primarily the contribution of the Ministry of Defense builders.<br />
Today, our capital and other large cities are filled with advertisements about<br />
the construction and sale of luxury homes for the modern elite of Russia. For<br />
“only” $1 million you can acquire a very nice apartment. It would be useful for<br />
the modern slanderers of our his<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>to</strong> remember that, during the period from<br />
1966 through 1990, the rocket-space industry alone built more than 14 million<br />
square meters of residential housing. In terms of modern housing prices that is<br />
$1.5 trillion! In addition, MOM alone built schools for the general public <strong>to</strong><br />
accommodate 59,300 pupils, kindergartens <strong>to</strong> accommodate 74,000 children,<br />
hospitals with 8,550 beds, polyclinics accommodating 19,100 visits per shift,<br />
professional institutes accommodating 14,360 students, clubs and cultural centers<br />
accommodating 7,400 individuals, sport complexes, swimming pools, dispensaries,<br />
pioneer camps, recreational areas, and holiday retreats. Practically all of this<br />
was accessible <strong>to</strong> hundreds of thousands of individuals, creating the necessary<br />
psychological frame of mind for the field of cosmonautics and the peoples’ belief<br />
in <strong>to</strong>morrow.<br />
In light of these facts, one must say that Afanasyev was a unique minister. He,<br />
his deputies, and the direc<strong>to</strong>rs of the allied ministries bore personal responsibility<br />
for a broad range of scientific, technological, political, and social issues that were<br />
critical <strong>to</strong> the prestige, security, and might of the State.Afanasyev and his deputies<br />
worked in close contact with many of the scientific institutions of the Academy of<br />
Sciences.Virtually every fundamental decision concerning cosmonautics was made<br />
with the participation of the President of the Academy of Sciences.<br />
the experience of working in rocket-space technology shows that success<br />
occurs where and when each individual anywhere in the enormous and complex<br />
system always performs his or her duty. In this sense, it is difficult for his<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>to</strong><br />
select leaders in politics, economics, and science.<br />
It would be a mistake <strong>to</strong> think that statesmen, who possessed an elevated sense<br />
of responsibility and who were personally interested in the successes of cosmonautics,<br />
always made the optimal decisions. An example of this is the his<strong>to</strong>ry of our<br />
N1-L3 program—the manned expedition <strong>to</strong> the Moon. The lunar program<br />
required the expenditure of great resources and the concentration of design and<br />
production capacities under a single painstakingly selected project. Khrushchev<br />
personally tried <strong>to</strong> reconcile the technical disagreements between Chief Designers<br />
Korolev and Glushko. He did not succeed. Moreover, he supported Chelomey’s<br />
alternative proposals. Khrushchev, and after him Brezhnev, as the Secretaries of the<br />
Central Committee; Ustinov, who was responsible for rocket-space technology;<br />
Minister Afanasyev; the Ministers of Defense; and all the others comprising the<br />
“Big Nine” of the military-industrial complex were required <strong>to</strong> obtain the<br />
resources for achieving both military-space “strategic parity” and the peaceful<br />
lunar program from a single state budgetary pocket.<br />
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