WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS!

presently desirable is right and certainly lying in bed seems presently very desirable.
Yet before rushing to a snap judgment, she must dispose of the principle which holds
that anything which seems presently desirable is likely, in the long run, to be wrong.
That principle, of course, has certain exceptions and qualifications. One is to the
effect that any action, or inaction, which seems presently so desirable that a failure to
indulge the desire may affect the disposition over a period of hours will, in such
circumstances, be the right action, or inaction, at least if that period of hours is taken
as controlling for the future. Clearly, that exception now applies.
Yet, in all fairness, the lady must admit that there is an exception to the
desirable-equals-right rule, to the effect that the denial of whatever seems desirable
may, by imparting a sense of nobility, become desirable in its own right and
therefore proper. There seems to be a deadlock. It will be a close decision.
Perhaps precedent will help. Yesterday the lady arose immediately. But
yesterday’s decision is not necessarily controlling because yesterday the sun was
shining; today is an ugly day. Such a disparity in the relevant facts cannot fairly be
ignored. The problem remains unsettled.
Then the lady remembers that she has an appointment with her hairdresser
that morning. Manifestly, this brings into play the well-recognized legal rule, a
sub-principle of the desirable-equals-right principle, that appointments, voluntarily
made and in which time is of importance, must be kept on time. The
sub-sub-principle that appointments voluntarily made in haste and later regretted
need not be kept on time and the sub-sub-sub-principle that appointments
involuntarily made need not be kept at all are both obviously beside the point here.
The Law, finally tracked to earth, seems to decree that the lady must rise.
And so she gets up. Not, of course, because she wants to keep an appointment
with her hairdresser. Rather, because all the relevant legal principles point to such a
decision. Anything which seems presently desirable is right – and she wants to get
her hair done. Anything which seems presently desirable is likely in the long run to
be wrong – and she would still like to lie in bed a little longer. Anything so desirable
that a failure to indulge the desire will affect the disposition, is right, in at least a
limited sense – and if she doesn’t get her hair done today she’ll go mad. The denial
of what seems desirable can impart a sense of nobility which makes the denial
proper – and she will indeed feel noble if she gets right up. Appointments must be
kept on time if you want to keep them on time – and the lady is afraid her hairdresser
would be unable to fit her in later. Moreover, yesterday’s precedent, although not
here controlling, points suggestively to the same decision. There is thus no doubt at
all about The Law of the case. And the decision automatically follows The Law.
60