WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS!

Finally, after dinner, the question arises whether the lady and her husband
should go to the movies or should instead stay home and listen to the radio and go to
bed early. She wants to go to the movies. Her husband wants to stay home. But
clearly her husband’s decision is not and should not be controlling. Like the decree
of a lower court, it must be given due weight and yet the whole problem must be
carefully examined ab initio in order to insure that final decision be rendered in
accordance with The Law.
She remembers that The Law is that anything which seems presently desirable
is right, and certainly going to the movies seems presently very desirable. Yet
before rushing to a snap judgment, she must dispose of the principle which holds
that anything which seems presently desirable is likely, in the long run, to be wrong.
That principle, of course, has certain exceptions and qualifications. One is to the
effect that any action, or inaction, which seems presently so desirable that a failure to
indulge the desire may affect the disposition over a period of hours will, in such
circumstances, be the right action, or inaction, at least if that period of hours is taken
as controlling for the future. Clearly that exception now applies.
Yet, in all fairness, the lady must admit that there is an exception to the
desirable-equals-right rule, to the effect that the denial of whatever seems desirable
may, by imparting a sense of nobility, become desirable in its own right, and
therefore proper. There seems to be a deadlock. It will be a close decision.
Perhaps precedent will help. Last night the lady and her husband went to the
movies. But last night’s decision is not necessarily controlling because last night it
was Gary Cooper; tonight it is some foreign film. Such a disparity in the relevant
facts cannot fairly be ignored. The problem remains unsettled.
Then the lady realizes that she is quite tired and has a busy day ahead of her
tomorrow. Manifestly, this brings into play the well-recognized legal rule, a
sub-principle of the desirable-probably-wrong-in-the-long-run principle, that it is
safer, even at some inconvenience, to look one’s best at a tea party. Various
sub-principles and exceptions and qualifications, concerning the amount of
inconvenience which the rule will tolerate, are obviously beside the point here. The
Law, finally tracked to earth, seems to decree that the lady and her husband must
stay home.
And so they stay home. Not, of course, because the lady wants to look well at
her tea party tomorrow. Rather, because all the relevant legal principles point to
such a decision. Anything which seems presently desirable is right – and she wants
to get enough sleep. Anything which seems presently desirable is likely in the long
run to be wrong – and she would still rather like to go to a movie. Anything so
desirable that a failure to indulge the desire will affect the disposition is right, in at
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