WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS!

The lady’s next two problems are comparatively easy, their answers dictated
by long lines of solid precedent. Should she bother to brush her teeth? Yes, because
she has always interpreted her Law that way, under the general principle that
whatever is said to be good for the health is right. Should she turn her hot shower
cold before she gets out? No, because she has always interpreted her Law that way,
under the general principle that whatever is said to be good for the health is likely to
be undesirable and therefore, by simple legal logic, wrong.
The choice of a dress to wear downtown, a choice which narrows down to a
practical black number, two months old, and a brand-new blue and white print,
brings other legal concepts into the picture. There is the concept of economy –
embodied in the principle that what is economical is right and also in the
sub-principle that what is economical in the short run is probably extravagant in the
long run – and this concept seems to favor the black dress which will not get dirty so
easily. But the concept of smartness, a typical legal concept in that its contents and
meaning are constantly changing from time to time and from place to place, seems to
favor the blue and white dress.
The lady’s decision in this matter is judicial in the extreme. She bows to the
paramount principle that in question of dress, whatever is smart is right, recognizing
as she does so that this is one of her few rules of Law to which there is almost no
exception, the only legal question which ever arises concerning it being what is
smart. But in deference to the principle of economy, she determines to keep her
dress clean by riding downtown in a taxi instead of on a street car. In thus
reconciling a conflict between two apparently irreconcilable principles, the lady has
displayed her mastery of the legal process.
Once downtown, the lady is aware that she has entered a different legal
jurisdiction. The same general principles are, in the main, still good Law, but their
interpretation tends to vary. For instance, what seems presently desirable is still
right and what seems presently desirable is still likely, in the long run, to be wrong,
yet the question as to what is presently desirable involves a greater emphasis on the
rule that what other people believe to be proper is desirable, and a correspondingly
lesser insistence on the home rule that what other people believe to be proper is
usually undesirable.
Thus the lady, after careful consideration of the question whether to give her
hairdresser a generous tip or merely an adequate tip, finds the solution in the
principle that what other people believe to be proper is desirable, especially when
outside the home jurisdiction. Narrowing down this principle so that “people”
means “person” and “person” refers to the hairdresser – a simple legal deduction –
she leaves a generous tip. This ruling is also in strict conformity with the abstract
legal ideal of economy, when considered in the light of the well-recognized legal
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