January-February - Air Defense Artillery

Keitel, chief of the high command, survived the many purges
and remained Hitler's Chief of Staff to the end.
vVhene\'cr. in the future, historians trv to write obi
dispassionate military analyses of the' German def
\;Vorld vVar II. one question is bound to arouse a grea
of discussion: \\'Iw did the German General Staff let
in for the fatal Ru;sian campaign. which was without
its crucial blunder?
There have been many stories current to the effect
important German gene~als and general staff officer
lendy protested against Hitler's Russian \'entures. Th
The contents of this article do not necessarily reflec
opinion of the War Department, G-2, or the Milita
telligence Service.
torians will leel in dutv bound to find the objectors
record the protests.
But thev can save themselves their efforts. Prates
protests th~re were at all. never penetrated the inner
tuary of Hitler's headquarters. Officers close to Hide
members of the inner coterie of the great German Ge
Staff, since Germany's surrender. have cleared up
mystery and revealed the common guilt of Hitler an
General Staff for the attack on Russia.
No true opposition was raised by the General
against Hitler's decision in the autumn of 1940 to d
war on Russia the following spring. And while there
undoubtedly generals and general staff officers who felt
an attack on Russia was a mistake, not a single man of
and prestige spoke in protest.
\ Vhat is the explanation of the doglike acceptan
Hitler's gamble with the fate of Germany by these c
scientific soldiers? How was it possible that not 0
them demanded that the Fiihrer review the basic
leadino to his fateful decision? Behind
o
of the German generals lies a tale that
this humble sil
reveals like no
the deterioration of the militarv tradition and mil
integrity that so long characterize'd the Prussian army.
that reveals the moral and psychological causes of
manv's destruction.
Why did the German Gene
tante, to lead the Wehrma