January-February - Air Defense Artillery

th II Corps in the Camino-i\lignano-Cassino sector to
~\ ide heavy antiai~cra.ft protection to forward artillery
ind lines of commuOicatlon.
The Battalion fired in eleven of twenty-two enemy air
actions that occurred when it was stationed on this front. A
al of I H rounds of 90mm and 5,385 rounds of caliber
- ammunition accounted for five enemy aircraft destroyed
d one damaged.
Since most of the Jerrv missions in this sector were re-
rieted to verv low level'bombino and strafino and hence
~ 0 0'
were essentially automatic weapons targets, it was decided
III experiment with the 900101 guns in a secondary role of
oem I support artillery. A field artillery SOP was drawn
up after the experiments by the Battalion Commanding
Ricer and his S-3. This is believed to be the first SOP
prepared for terrestrial fire with 90mm guns.
Hesults were excellent, particularlv _ aoainst 1:> enemy • !Jerson-
(leI concentrations. It was Found that the 90's could deliver
fast ,1Odaccurate fire within a few minutes after a mission
....tb assigned. The battalion fired 2,524 rounds of 90mm
IJ1 24 missions on this front ( II observed, 13 unobserved)
and was highly complimented on its work by the II Corps
_
Counterbatterv Officer and the Commandino
1:>
General of
,he 71st Field Artillery Brigade, through whose headquarlcrs
the Battalion fire was coordinated. Hounds from the
68th's 90's fom1ed a part of the famous "j\ Iill ion Dollar
Barrage" directed against enemy positions on j\ Tount Cam-
lIlO.
On 31 December 1943 march order was again received,
and the battalion pulled out of the II Corps sector to bivouac
n the Naples area pending its next assignment.
!\NZIO
lhe morning of 22 January 1944 found two firing bat-
I{'ries and the forward echelon of headquarters battery of
the battalion I)'ino off Anzio aboard two LST's awaitino their
1:> 1:>
turn to land. Several landino attempts were made durino
1:> ~
D-Day, but enemy artillery fire on the port and the crowded
conditions of the beaches made the attempts futile. Thus
it was not until D-plus-I that the initial elements of the
battalion debarked.
Battery "0" went directly to its battle position on X-Hay
Beach, and was set up and ready for action that night. Battery
"A" was unable to unload until the night of D-plus-l,
but was ready for action carlyon D-plus-2: On 27 January.
fOf\\ard elements of Batteries "B" and "C" arrived and
1110\eddirectly into battle positions. From D-Day to 5 February,
these four batteries constituted the only heavv antiaircraft
in action on the beachhead ..
.Since the beginning the Germans had been bringing in
remforcements from Fr:>nce, Northern Italv, and even the
Balkans. On 28 Januarv trh_ awaited counterattack against
the beachhead forces \~as launched. Planes bombed and
tr~fed the beachhead installations night and day. Enemy
antl.leT)' fired counterbattery against the 90's in an attempt
CO sIlence them during air raids. Gun crews. on the alert
henty-four hours a dav, were called on to sandwich some
estrial fire missions between air raids.
O? one occasion Battery "0," firing a terrestrial mission,
mterrupted by an air alert. \Vith .the terrestrial mission
rarilv cancelled. the batten' enga ed the onlv aerial
THE SHOOTI1\' 68TH 57
Newly prepared field artillery firing position.
~arget within range. then, having satisfied itself that no
lurther targets were forthcoming, continued its terrestrial
problem while keepino close tabs on enemy aircraft in the
.1:>_
area but lar out of ranoe.
1:>
Bv 19 Februarv the counterattack had been classed an
exp~nsive Genna~ failure. Though several other attempts
were later made to push the beachhead forces into the sea
and remove the ever-present threat to Gennan lines of
communication to the southern front, none proved either
as formidable or as costly.
Of some 298 air attacks during the period 23 January-6
June, the Battalion fired in 224, expending 39,933 rounds
of 90ml1l and 60,242 rounds of caliber .50 ammunition,
and being credited with the destruction of 46 enemy aircraft
and 23Y2 probables. Port defenses were credited with
an additional seven enemy aircraft destroyed during this
period.
At Anzio the lessons learned in terrestrial fire on the
Camino front proved invaluable. The battalion fired 7. I 53
rounds of 90mm in general support of beachhead artillery
between 23 Januarv and 22 Mav, and 4,930 rounds in direct
support of the 45~h Infantry 'Division during the breakthrough
23-29 May 1944. Due to its prior experience in
conducting terrestrial fire, the battalion was chosen as the
controlling headquarters for all 90mm guns employed in
the field artillery role on the beachhead. This consisted of
coordinating the fires of four AA battalions.
On 6 June the Battalion left Anzio and proceeded to
Civitavecchia, where it was deployed in an AA defense of
that port. Of four enemy air actions there, two were engaged
in, with no known results. But it was here that the
68th Regiment was finally broken up. The battalion had
often operated more or less independently; now it \V3S
physically reorganized and redesignated the 68th AAA
Gun Battalion. The youth had become a man.
From Civitavecchia the Battalion was ordered back to
bivouac in the Salerno area. arriving 9 July 1944, to await
and prepare for what turned out to be the strangest assignment
in its career.
SOUTHERN FRA~CE AND THE j\TARITIl\lE ALPS
The invasion of the French Hiviera, originally intended
to be timed with the Normandy operation, was launched
some two months later. 15 Auoust 1944. Despite the delay,
a CO -