January-February - Air Defense Artillery

FRO~l THE FIGHTI~G FRO:\'TS
appro.lCh and e/fect an illumination well before the
ife plane reached the de~ended point.
he tactical disposition of the elements was built about
offset triangles. The inner triangle was to consist of
searchlights only. t\t either end of the airstrip. 200
s from the landing mat a carry light was placed. The
d carry light was placed to the airstrip Rank. 800 to 1000
s from the center of the strip. The lights at the ends of
strip were placed well to the Rank and subsequent incitS
justified the necessity for this. No possible obstruct~
landing or departing aircraft could be permitted and
ugh caution was used in placing these lights to the side,
s;\"Cfal occasions bomb-laden fighter bombers barely
,ed these liohts by a matter of feet.
o .
'rom the disposition of the three carry searchlights it was
ible to optain complete coyerage of the strip and the
lIeent area. If necessary these three lights would place a
opy of light over the striI? either to home a lost aircraft
10 furnish illumination lor automatic-weapon fire. t\
ther function of these lights was to illuminate the strip
per if so requested by the airstrip commander.
'he three radar-controlled searchlights of the platoon
e 10 be placed in the outer triangle and, if possible, were
ffset the inner triangle searchlights. The radar-controlled
lIS \rere to be approximately 2000 yards from the strip
h the same interval between lights. By offsetting the
er lights any possible dead or obscured ayenues of apaeh
were eliminated.
rhe main difficulty in siting these radars was that concrable
mutual interference was to be expected. Later
nts showed this fear to be wholly without foundation for
sets operated extremely well ~nder the circumstances.
c absence of interference may well be due to the density
the now famous Normandy h~dgerows which would hav~
n more accurately described as tree rows. The advance
ty in selecting tllese radar sites did its utmost to find
se having a certain amount of terrain mask but the Rat
lire of the countryside made this almost an impossibility.
few sites had some mask but the great majority had
thing but flat, heavily wooded terrain.
o appreciate the problem of preparing positions is to unstand
the nature of the well-known Normandy hedge-
's. In fact, they are not hedgerows in the American sense
the word but rather a line of thick, close trees and bushes.
cry field is bordered with them. The trees are bv no
ans small, often towering to seventy or eighty feet. t\
tural line of sight was therefore difficult if not impossible
find. Cutting down a single row of trees would not solve
. problem, for beyond that row were more fields with
e rows of trees. To' overcome these obstructions and to
.in a fi\'e-degree line of sight which would permit iIIumi-
IOnof low-flying aircraft at maximl,/m range, towers were
.ted for both the searchlight and distant electric control
1Ion.
he towers for searchlights were four feet in height;
for the control station were six feet. Construction of
towers was mostly of sandbags with a center" of short
s. A number were erected by building a platform across
hedgerow using the stumps of fallen trees as columns.
searchlioht was rolled int p mr)\'PT
which in turn backed up to the platfonn and the searchlight
was rolled on to it. The control-station towers were built
with sandbags in the center of fields and securely wired
down to pre\'ent toppling.
Though much hard labor was necessary to build these
towers, later results fullv justified the e/fort for the fivedegree
line of sight was ~btained. ~ lany of these excellent
restilts would not have been attained had it not been for the
cooperation of the Corps of Engineers in furnishing the
services of their bulldozers and power-saw units. Their invaluable
assistance enabled the rapid construction of these
towers and made it possible for this organization to become
operational with the least possible delay at a time when
illumination was urgently needed.
ENEl\IY ACTIVITY
lIpon becoming operational on D plus 12, it was discovered
that the initial estimate of the enemy's probable
tactics prO\'ed to be incorrect. Contrary to expectation most
enemy activity was from intermediate altitudes and on a
few (nfreque~t occasions from low altitudes. This also
was a change from the earlier enemy tactics in Normandy
when more attacks were executed from \'erv low level with
little concern about cloud cover. .
It is not possible to disclose the number of illuminations
of enemy aircraft made by this organization. However the
number was not great due to the enemy's failure to fly on
clear and cloudless nights and his wide use of natural cover.
If the night was clear there was very little enemy activity.
\"hen a plane ventured from cover and was illuminated,
violent evasive action was taken immediately. A prolonged
illumination under these circumstances was extremch. difficult.
Once the plane entered the cloud bank the doud's
density prevented further illumination. The distance a hostile
plane stayed from his cover was small. On one occasion
an enemy aircraft was illuminated for an instant and immediatel),
dove vertically into a cloud bank.
During the first two weeks of the Normandy campaign
the greatest number of enemy attacks occurred at either
dusk or just before dawn. In the beginning it was virtually
S.O.P. For the enemy to appear at the moment our fighters
were landing at their bases. Later on, however, this activit)'
greatly declined.
Experience in this campaign has shown that the German
pilot has a far greater fear of searchlights than American
pilots. The latter do not become as panicky as the enemy
nor are their evasive actions as violent as those of the enem\,.
Evidently the German pilots still remember their costly
encounters with searchlights during the Battle of Britain .
It is often a trait of human nature to overestimate one's own
accomplishments, but from enemy activities before and after
the arrival of searchlights this organization cannot help but
believe that it materially contributed to rendering ineffective
enemv activity over the Normandv beachhead.
An~ther es~ape used almost as' widely as cloud cover by
the enemy was that of "window" which is simply the dropping
from aircraft of strips of tin foil which interfere with
radars by clouding the scopes. On nearly every occasion
that enemy aircraft was present in the area window was
detected in the same vicinity. These attempts at interfPTPnr
h:l ic "rn n;7"t;"n h.:;>.rlhoo"