January-February - Air Defense Artillery

:\ SI:\GLE DEPART:-'IEi'\T OF ~ATI00:AL DEFE0:SE 39
~rorage space through maintenance of separate reseryes
re one coordinated reserve would have sufficed.
Bee-ause the twO services are not fully informed of each
r's needs. there has been actual conRict between them
endea\'oring to obtain certain types of real property.
h competition not only created confusion and antagonbut
resulted in increased prices, since the two services
re placed in the position of bidding against each other to
benefit of the landowner and to the detriment of the
payer. :-'Ioreover. lack of common standards for building
~Iruction in the fighting areas resulted in many different
_ of ]i\'ing guarters and supply facilities in the same
As cm'isioned by the \ Var Department, unification of
,Jrlned forces would provide for over-all supervision of
procurement and the preparation of mobilization plans
industn' in the event of another war. Coordination of
e matters would be afforded by an Assistant Secre-
) for Procurement. \ Vorking closely with the Director
Common Supply and Hospita]ization, the Assistant SeclIr)'
would be responsible for eliminating duplications in
business management of the department. He would lay
II n policies governing procurement by the services forces
Ihe Army. Nm'y and Air components, and by the Direcof
Common Supply and Hospitalization.
The Director would be charged with the procurement
all items of common supply, such as food, blankets, motor
bides and the like. He also would supervise hospita]izan
within the Zone of the Interior (the United States)
d perhaps within the base sections of the communication
1(', O\'erseas (rear areas). The Assistant Secretarv, with
e approval of the Secretary, would determine which items
ould be classed as in common supply. As the organization
incd experience it is possible that new duties wou]d be
igned to the Director. He might, for example, be charged
Ib supervision of the construction of military housing
ilities in the United States. But since such matters can
I be worked out by a process of gradual evolution, the
ar Department's plan suggests that at the outset only
isputable items of common supply and hospitalization
assigned to the Director. The Director's personnel
uld be drawn from the Air, Army and Navy, thus bringto
the centralized procurement office their experience
d knowledge of the special problems of their own serv-
The \Var Department's plan wou]d continue the present
actice by which the service ha\'ing the predominant
terest is charged with the procurement of items used to
k~r degree by other services. The Navy might be
arged with procurement of all ships and small boats,
etber operated by the Navy or the Army, and the Air
ces could be made responsible for the purchase of all
racbute eguipment. whether used by the Air Forces or
Reet Air Arm.
IXFORMATIO:\' SERVICES
The \ Var Department's unification plan groups all legise
affairs and public information services of a single
a~trnent under one central agency, The plan proposes
lian Assistant Secretarv of ~ational Defense to head
gency. This would a"ssure a sound public relations
program. gi\'ing the public all possible information except
that having to do with militarv securitv.
~ .,
CEXTIlAL bTELLlGE1'CE AGENCY
Intelligence acti\'ities embrace a field in which close integration
of effort is essential. \ Vhile the scope of a central
intelligence agency is debatable, the best military thought
tends toward the conclusion that the military intelligence
should be centralized under the Chief of Staff of the Anned
Forces and should be an integral part of the over-all military
structure. Coordination of the military intelligence with
other intelligence agencies outside the Armed Forces or
with a central agency if one is established would be
through an Assistant Secretary.
NEED FOR COl\I:-IOX PERSOl\':\'EL POLICIES
Differences in personnel policies and practices between
the Army and Nav)' have been not only a source of major
problems to each of the services but also have led to public
misunderstanding and criticism.
These differences cover a wide range of personnel administration,
from recruiting and procurement through
such matters as promotions, allowances, manner of selecting
officers and integrating reserve ofIicers, awards and decorations,
to the discharge point system and demobilization
policy.
In personnel procurement, lack of a common system and
standards gave rise to duplication of operating personnel
and facilities, as in the case of duplicate aviation cadet selection
boards and separate recruiting stations. There has been
sharp competition between the services for various scarce
categories of skilled manpower, as illustrated by the race
between the services to commission doctors.
Congress provided the services with an effective and
adeguate system of Selective Service. Neverthe]ess, both
the Army and Navy continued direct, competitive and unrestricted
recruiting, each with its own recruiting establishment,
until a Presidential order in December 1942 stopped
all recruiting among men of draft age.
Lvlilitary manpower problems begin in peacetime. They
continue through all the stages of preparation for war,
through initial to total mobilization and until the war is
ended. The \Var Department believes there must be some
one authority in the planning stage, in the initial mobilization
and throughout the emergency, who can resolve the
differences between the services, who can weigh their demands
for men, and make final determination as to the
number each shall have and the standards under which
they shall be selected and assigned. There was no such
authority during the war, and although many problems
were solved by mutual agreement, satisfactory solution to
many never was obtained.
Should all the armed forces be organized within a single
department, there could be complete coordination on matters
pertaining to personnel, and recommendations to the
Congress as to the strength of the forces to be maintained
would be closely coordinated with respect to their peacetime
and initial war missions.
The public would have had a better understanding of
demobilization had a single agency been responsible for
developing p!(]ns for the return of soldiers, sailors and