January-February - Air Defense Artillery

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34 Battalion. under command of First Lieutenant John F. \Velch, was sent from the Seventh Army Area the night of 3 February 1945 and arri\'ed in XXI Corps Area (rear) 040400A February 1945. i\lajor Raymond J. Alberts. S-3 of the Fifth Antiaircraft Artillery Group, and Lieutenant John F. \Velch. platoon commander of the searchlights. reported to the 3d Infantry Di\'ision and received the following instructions from the Chief of Staff and the Assistant G-3. 1. The 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments \\'ere to attack abreast on a line running east through the town of Bushiem attacking to the south to cut the road from Neuf-Brisach east and cut the Rhine River bridges. The 30th Infantry Regiment was to attack from the edge of 'the forest below the town of \Vidensolen in frontal assault on Neuf-Brisach. 2. The lights were to be so positioned as to illuminate the area to a line running 5,500-6,000 yards south of the Line of Departure. 3. Lights were to be in position to be used at any time after 041630A February 1945. 4. Control of lights 'would be by platoon commander on direct order from G-3 of 3d Infantry Division. 5. Communications both bv wire a'nd radio would be established with the advance CP of 3d Infantrv Division. A radio to be furnished bv Division tuned to tl;e Division command set. . OPEHATION The terrain in which the offensive was made was a flat tableland cut through with drainage canals and interspersed with scattered patches of forest. In selecting a proper site consideration was given to a position that was well forward and yet would provide sight defilade to prevent silhouetting the attacking infantry and to prevent enemy observcrs from pinpointing thc source of light. A position was selected that placed the most forward light about 1,500 yards bchind the infantry clemcnts. Becausc of the need of ;dequate mask the lights were not placed parallel to the Line of Departure but ran on a line quartcring to the northeast. The lights moved into the position area at 1530A and were operating by 18301\. The assigned coverage was a front of 5,000-6,000 yards and five of the six lights were in operation continuously, one bcing rccarboncd. All lights used the focus bcam and were at approximately 400-500 mils clcvation. The beam was raised high enough over the mask level to prevent illumination of the treetops to prevent location of the source of light. The infantry reached the Line of Departure at 050015A and jumped off in thc attack. The lights were turned on and operated until 0l40t\. At 0 140A hours the Infantry, attacking on the left, requested a shift in the lights to the left to give them more illumination. A change in azimuth was made on four lights, two beams straddling the Rhine at Brisach, Germany. The lights were kept on continuously at these azimuths until 0600A hours. On the night of 5-6 February the searchlights were again used from the original positions from the hours of 2130A to 0655A. On the night of 6-7 February searchlights were used from 2100A to 0630A hours. The azimuth of lights I and 2 were shifted at 2400A hours to (Jive more illumination to THE COAST ARTILLERY JOllR:-\AL the the 75th Infanm' Division . 3d Infantry Division. attackino on " On the night the riglu of 7-8 F three lights were moved to new positions. The ligh on from 1945A to 0645A hours. At 200A hours the a of light # 1 was changed to increase the illuminati bridgebuilding in the 75th Infantry Division sector. During the period 4-8 February 1945 the sky \\. erallv overcast both da)' and nioht with intermittent The - cloud formations were low " and dense enough to good mirror effect. The focus beam of li~ht reflected the clouds diffused to give the effect ot pale moo which was desired. DISCUSSION OF OPEHATION HESULTS The call for battlefield illumination using antia searchlights came suddenly and the employmcnt lights was done on a "rush call" basis. Searchlights had previously used in offensive action but generally in terrain that allowed complete defilade for the lights. ] action, the lights were used in a table-flat terrain. A leafless forest about 800 yards deep at the narrowest s sight mask was the best that could be found in the close enough to the Line of Departure to give illumi in depth. To be effective battlcfield illumination f fensive action must light the area behind the obj which can be done only by use of focus beam light. The reaction to the searchlight by the regimental manders of the 7th, 15th, and 30th Infantry Regiments Yen' favorable. Information obtained from thesc units the- value of the searchlights in this action is as follo\\'S 1. Greater lateral control by company, platoon. slluad leaders made possible. 2. Terrain features outline allowed for more rapid ment to objective and greater ease in orientation. 3. Light mask was adequate: source could not be pointed. 4. Comments from the regiments are quoted: 7th Infantry: 'Thc lights helped particularly in co ling our formations, maintaining contact within the tal ions, and recognizing terrain fcatures. In attacking Biesheim to the Neuf-Brisach railroad station the art' light allowed us to move with less effort and grcater than we could have done \\:ithout the lights. During t tack the searchlights made it possible to pick out c terrain features, especially groups of buildings and \\' areas which could be seen plainly because of the lig the background, and thereby enabled us to go direc our objective. Fire was received by follow.up suppl~ hicular traffic and the drivers blamed it on the prese the searchlights." 15th Infantry: "It is recommended that this means lumination be uscd whenever possible on moonless ni. The advantages gained from this illumination (imp control, speed of movement, facilitated supply operal increased efficiency of outposts and guards, decided aid night driving, visibility of targets and landmarks, and natural confidence produced with the increased vi sib" more than offset the disadvantages." 30tl1 Infantry: "During the attack the lights were in able in assisting unit commanders to maintain cont their units. keep direction and orient themselves when
ghly recommended by this headquarters that the use .1tGircraft searchlights for night operations be con- ed." CO;\'CLUSIO;\'S rom information obtained from the Fifth AntiaircraFt "len' Groups initial use of AA searchlights for battle- :iumination the following facts stand out as being tln' of consideration whenever a plan for searchlight use lade. . In an offensive action lights should be placed far ugh fomard to illuminate all initial objectives of the nu\'. . I~ an offensive action it is not feasible to attempt to frog searchlights and keep the battlefield illuminated FRO~I THE FIGHTI0.'G FRO;,\TS 35 if the infantry maintains a rapid advance and the situation is Auid. 3. A platoon of searchlights is the minimum necessary to cover a division front. 4. Both radio and wire communications to the Division CP are necessary. 5. Searchlights should be used prior to the night of the attack to avoid alerting the enemy. 6. Infantrymen should be oriented prior to the initial use of the lights. Lights used in defensive operations prior to offensive use would illustrate to infantrymen the amount of his exposure as the attacker. 7., Flat terrain offers no outstanding hazards to employment of lights as long as proper sight mask is obtained. \\loaded areas are excellent.
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Page 3 and 4: OAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL NDED IN 1892
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Page 9 and 10: RADAR - \ SURVEY used on the SCR-58
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Page 21 and 22: FRO.\l THE FlGHTL'\G FRO.'\TS \I .1
Page 23 and 24: and with it the use of searchlights
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Page 27 and 28: FR01\l THE FIGHTI:\G FRO~TS "ng out
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Page 51 and 52: 1946 :\IRBOR~E AAA I~ NEW GlII~EA P
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Page 59 and 60: th II Corps in the Camino-i\lignano
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Page 75 and 76: LT. COL. JAl\lES T. BARBER LT. COL.
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Page 83 and 84: 0JE\\'S A~D CO~IME~T med to regard
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January-February - Air Defense Artillery

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