January-February - Air Defense Artillery

11\' had been killed. two wounded and o\'er fifteen
prisoner.
ecolld Sectioll of "B" Battery-Lielltellal/t Bel/jal/lill
J. Fisler
he half tracks, commanded bv T ec. 5 Louis Stadler and
leonard DeRienzo. 1r.. and dri\'en bv T ec. 5 Harold
del and T ec. 5 Robe'rt p, Sansone. I~oved out as or-
. \ \'hen they approached the ditch they heard a cry
help. Although they were fully aware that this exposed
was under enemy observation, both 'tracks stopped to
er aid to some wounded soldiers who had taken cover
he ditch. Immediately an enemy machine gun opened
bullets hitting the road around the 'tracks and grazing
'tracks themselves. The 'track commanders quickly ord
the 'tracks to return the fire forcing the enemy to
~e his fire and withdraw into the concrete emplacement.
I\\'ithstanding the probability of receiving bazooka fire
his open position. the half tracks continued the fire for
fOximatcly ten minutes, keeping the enemy holed up
il all the wounded could be evacuated from the ditch.
the same time, under co\'er of this fire, a tank destrover
brought into position to fire point-blank into the ~msure
of the emplacement.
\$ a result of this combined action our infantrv was able
ssault the emplacement, capture sixty-five P\V's, thereclearing
the road of fire, enabling our forces to move
,'ard unmolested.
Secolld Sectioll of "0" Battery-Lie/ltellallt John A.
Kelll/ed)'
11 17 December 1944, after traveling over mountain
lIs and cutting down trees to make a field of fire, two
ftracks were moved into position on a mountainside to
'preparation fire for an attack. "G" Company of the 30th
al1try Hegiment was to take I-Iill 616 with mortar and
chine-gun fire as preparation fire, due to the difficulty
bringing artillery fire on the objective. 1\t 0940 hours
'tracks opened fire in front of uG" Company and conued
firing as they advanced up the hill. After firing 2,660
nds of .50-cal. and 63 rounds of 37mm, orders were
en to cease firing. The area was well "hosed" and the
pany commander reported the fire very effective, causmany
of the enemy to disperse and run in confusion,
s aiding them to take their objective without delay or
vy losses.
Third Section of "0" Batter)'-Lielltenal/t 'Valter O.
McGee
\t HIO hours 29 i\Iareh 1945 two half tracks operatino
h "L" Company of the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, wer~
cd to fire into a wooded area in the vicinitv of Heichelim.
Germal1\'. The two half tracks, one 1\ I-IS and one
16. were set' up as roadblocks on the outskirts of town.
e infantry was in position 300 yards from the woods,
a listening post 200 yards from the woods. The infanen
at the post heard talking and rustling of the brush
captured one prisoner. The prisoner stated during intertion
that there was approximately a company in the
. A reconnaissance of the area was made and the 1\ 1-16
lIed and placec~i.nto_firing_position approximately 150
FRO;\' I THE FIGHTE\'G FRO;\,TS 29
~'ards from the woods. The area was sprayed with 800
rounds of .50-cal. and five prisoners were captured. 010
enemv fire was encountered. The ouns were reloaded and
, D
850 rounds were fired into the area again. Thirty prisoners
were captured, five of them \\'ounded.
First Section of "B" Batterl'-Lie/ltenallt Oscar B.
Rohe;ts
In_ positions just north of Strasburg with the 3d Bn. of
the Ith Infantry, a new type of firing was tried-adjusted
fire bv an OP, on a well-used intersection across the Rhine
River'. After adjusting the fire, a direct line from the OP
to gun positions was put in so that whenever traffic was observed
on the road the OP could call and oet fire immediateo
Iy; also during the hours of darkness the road was interdicted
once an hour. The results of this fire were such that
after t\\'o davs the traffic on the road had ceased. Ammunition
expenditure averaged around 2,000 rounds of .50-cal.
per day. The enemy countered with heavy machine-gun
fire and searching artillery fire.
The best test of the effectiveness of a supporting arm or
weapon, it seems to us, is the testimony of the supported
troops. \Vith this thouoht in mind,
.' 0
vIew 01 the Infantry after the Colmar
nated.
we souoht to oet the
0 0
pocket had been elimi-
\Ve were of the opinion that reports from the Infantry
might be more objective if they were made to the Division
rather than to us directly. In other words, if the support
didn't satisfy them they would express themsekes fully to
Division, whereas, from a mistaken attitude of politeness,
some defects might be suppressed in a report to us.
Obviously such a biased report would be useless to us.
\Ve therefore requested the Division G-3 to get a report
from the regiments in the name of the Division. Specifically
the regiments were asked to express their opinion as to the
effectiveness
sired.
of the support and suggest changes they de-
The replies from all four regiments (tile 25.hh Infantry
Hegiment was still attached to the division) were very favorable
to the program as we were handling it. As these reports
were substantially the same only one is quoted here:
Headquarters 30th Infantry
APO No.3
3 February 1945
SUBJECT: Use of Flakwagons \vith Infantry Battalions.
TO: Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division.
I. The following are examples to illustrate the use of Hakwagons
with Infantry Battalions both in the defense and
in the offense:
a. During the attack on Le Tholy, France 28 September-
10 October 1944, our Hakwagons were used extensively to
support each attack from hill to hill, firing overhead fire
into the wooded terrain as our troops approached in the
assault. As positions were seized the Hakwagons moved up
to cover Hanks and gaps caused by extremely wide fronts
assigned. Each attack is normally followed by an enemy
counterattack:. and in every case the Hakwagons materially