January-February - Air Defense Artillery

58
and the fact that preparations must have indicated to the
enemy that an attack was certainly coming in this region.
a considerable amount of tactical surprise was achie\'cd
through the use of ruses and diversions-details of which
will hm'e to await telling. Suffice it to say that the Germans
were running around like the prO\'erbial chicken minus its
top-piece, expecting the landings in a totally different
quarter than where the Allied forces actually struck, in
the region around St. Raphael and St. T ropez, midway
between Toulon and Nice. The whole operation has been
called a tactician's dream. inasmuch as a strong force.
skillfully employed, struck swiftly and decisively at a weak
point on the hostile coast and reached objectives ahead of
schedule with a minimum of loss.
From the AA viewpoint conditions prior to the invasion
were ideal. All the units involved were old hands at the
invasion game. Ample rehearsals were conducted well in
advance of loading for the "lift," everybody was thoroughly
briefed on the well-]aid. comprehensi\'e attack plan. There
was no reason for anything to go sour. and nothing did.
The 68th went in on D-Day and D-Day night (from
2245 to 0300 hours) in the vicinity of St. Raphael, and
again deployed in an AA defense of a port and beach area.
Opposition was comparatively light. In fact, an officer of
another battalion was told bv a French civilian that on
D-minus-4 the Germans had pulled all their troops out of
Frejus and St. Haphnel and sent them west townrd Toulon.
leaving about 300 or 400 Czechs, Hussians and Poles, officered
nnd cadred by Germans, in the target nrea. The Inst
hostile nrtillerv fire on the beaches in the sector of the
supported division censed nbout 1430 D-Day. However,
Battery "A" did mnnnge to go into position in the darkness
only 200 ynrds from nn enemy strongpoint. There was
minor excitement in the morning when the strongpoint
was cleaned out.
Four of the five enemy flights over the nrea during the
period 16 August-I7 September were engaged, the Battalion
firing 446 rounds of 90mm and 192 rounds of caliber
.50 with no known results. Enemy Rights over the Red
Beach nrea were mainlv reconnaissnnce.
r. leanwhi]e the inva~ion had spread out like an inundating
flood, for once lea\'ing the 68th behind. The bulk of
the Seventh Army was advancing up the Hhone Valley.
Snow at Piera.Cava.
1HE COAST l\RTILLERY JOllR0::\L
Jall/lIlr} -Feln
scooping in enemy prisoners on its way to a junction
the Third Armv. The First Airborne Task Force. \\'
had been drop~d north and \\'est inland from St. Rap
and Frejus early on D-Day. was mO\'ed to the east to g
the Franco-Ita]ian border along the \ 'ar River near Can
on a line extending from the r. lediterranean to Larche P
It was with this latter headquarters that the 68th fau
employment.
The FABTF needed general support artillery and t
68th had the experience, so the 68th got the job. Alert
15 September. all batteries were in position in the r.lariti
Alps three days later, despite the fact that many of the B \'
talion vehicles \\'ere on detached service and equipmc ~
and personnel had to be shuttled for the move. t
This was strange country in which to operate. \ Vhen t
battalion and battery commanders went on reconnaissan
for positions, they found the terrain was not very suitabk
for the low trajectory of the 90mm gun, its principal elm
acteristic being that about half of it was decidedly "up" a
the other half very much down. A pack howitzer ma (
would have been delighted. 1
The positions finally selected were such that the Batta~.:
ion wns split into two groups, with two batteries having Ollt I
field of fire and the other two having an entirely differ~
sector to fire upon. Batteries "A" and "B" were placed
the Cap r.lartin peninsula, so that they could engage t
German communications along the coast, while "e" a
"0" went inland where they could fire up a valley towarl
the Sospel area and thereby bring the inland German co
munication lines under fire.
This was a practical enough solution of the gene
problem. After that, the battery commanders had to pi
indi\'idual gun positions which would give them maximu
defilade and still allow them to undertake all possible targ
in range. In this regard somebody wns always robbil1!
Peter to pay Paul. And every time a battery displaced fex
ward as the enemy gradually withdrew. the tactical burg]all
had to be repeated .
Displacement forward was not the only reason for mores.
however, especially in the first week or so. Batteries ".i
and "B" caught it hot and heavy from German countcrba
tery fire in their somewhat exposed positions on Cap r. lar
tin. Two moves were necessary to get away from it, tbt
final positions being located on very high ground wit
Batten' "A" 770 meters above sea level and Batten' HE \
I ,000 -meters. Hather than proving a handicap, the' gre31
altitude of the positions added to their capacity for FA fire.
\ Vhen both batteries were down close to sea level, targelS
near the French-Italian border were plasked bv mountains
running along the border. By moving them 'back a fel
thousand yards and emp]acing them on higher ground
these targets could be engaged. Later the enemy managed
to bring two 105mm guns to fire on Battery "A," but the fire.
was light and ineffective, most of the rounds landing on the
forward slope below the position.
In any case the Batta]ion gave as good as it got, whether
in counterbattery or support missions, and sometimes a I
better. Here are a few more of the interesting episodes.
On 25 September 1944, at 0650 hours, an air OP C'FI
ing Jeep" with artillery observer) spotted a train traveli
west to east toward the town of Ventamilla. The obsef\