January-February - Air Defense Artillery

30
assisted the Infantry in stopping these counterattacks and
inAicted heavv casualties on the enemy. Several times durino.:>
these • atta'cks all ammunition was' fired. P\ V's verified
the effecti\'eness of this fire.
b. DuriDg the 1\10RTr\GNE Forest operation from 25
October to II November 1944. the Aakwagons were used
offensi\'elv and defensiveh' bv each battalion. Our sector
was so extensive that plat~n positions could maintain contact
only by means of patrols. This enabled the enemy to
infiltrate behind our forward elements and cut our supply
line. An attack was launched to drive out this enemy group,
the Aakwagons participating. Prisoners stated that the tremendous
firepower and striking power of the flakwagons
was too much for them. The enemy was driven from our
positions. A similar incident occurred in another sector of
the forest and was similarly handled. The fire of multiple
.50-caliber guns and automatic 37mm is so great that it
has a terrifying effect on enemy morale.
In a later phase of this same operation the town of
SAlIGERAY was attacked. The Aakwagons were used to
suppo~t the attack and were extremely effective in driving
enemy personnel from buildings into the open where they
were (Iuickly killed or captured.
c. During our attack 15-19 December 1944, one battalion
was held up on the high ground north of KAYSERS-
BERG, Alsace. Artillerv and mortar fire were not too effective
because the enemv'used concrete shelters For protection.
An attack was succes;fully executed against these positions
bv usino , .:>
continued
Aakwaoon fire for close-in support. The fire was
.:>
until the advancino .:> InFantrv, was onl)' a few
yards away. \\Then the InFantry was ready to assault, fires
were lifted and the encmy was caught coming out of his
dugouts to man guns. Such close support is not possible
with artillery and mortars in wooded tcrrain. As a rcsult of
this action f~urteen enemy machine guns were knocked out
or captured, fifty cnemy killed and 100 captured. Two Ilak-
waoons fired 2,700 rounds of .50-caliber and 100 rounds
.:>
of 37mm.
2. Notes:
a. Our troops have developed a confidence in the tremendous
firepower of the flakwagon. It is now a morale
factor in our battalions.
b. \\Tith shortages of mortar and artillery ammunition
the Aakwagons have been used to excellent advantage for
interdictino 'enem)' rear areas. Statements of P\V's verify
.:> '
their effcctiveness in this role.
c. The incidents mentioned above are only a few examples
of the use of Aakwagons with Infantry Battalions.
Many more similar stories could be told. Flakwagons have
become a vital part of our battalions' and their importance
to the Infantrymen is immeasurable.
For the Regimental Commander;
R. H. NEDDERSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, 30th Infantry,
Executive Officer.
*
COl\1l\lENTS AND CONCLUSIOi'-'S
Our operations with the infantry have resulted in many
lessons learned. Some were lessons driven home in con-
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOllR,'\'AL Jmlllllry-Fe
firmation of standard tactical doctrine. Others were e
new to A,\ troops.
\ Vhat we consider the more important lessons I
may be of interest and help to other AA units unde
a ground-support role.
I. The most important thing is close liaison. This I' \
must be maintained at all times. not only with the inf
battalions, but equally important. with the tanks, TD'
AT elements operating with the battalion. and at t
with individual company commanders.
2. The 1\A OEllcer must be well infonned on the I
of all Friendly troops and their anticipated mo\'es. He
also gain knowledge of enemy positions and areas
which countcrattacks may be expected: or from which
and observation by the enemy may be anticipated.
3. The AA Officer should use the information he 0
to suggest missions for his weapons. Hc knows best
he can do effectively. He must be aggressivc and not
for the infantry to call upon him. This line of action I
not only insure the full utilization of the weapons i
common effort. but will insure that the missions arr 1
corrcct ones for our e(]uipmcnt.
4. \Vhere possible follow the attached armored eleJ
This will give added protcction against antitank fire
land mines.
5. Extensivc reconnaissance should alwavs be made,
reconnaissance
tions permit.
should be made on foot if'timc and
6. CamouAaoe.:> is very, im!)ortant. It has becn
however, that natural camoullage is better suited
situation than the issucd ncts.
7. Thc use of radios in night movcmcnts has pr r
helpful in directing the 'tracks thru diEllcult roads.
AA OHlcer leading in the jecp transmits advice of
holcs, low trees, mud holes, etc. as he proceeds.
8. It is not possible to expect the 'tracks with the in
try to participate in antiaircraft defense. 1\,lany times t
missions are at night and they need the day for rehabi (
tion. Often the 'tracks must be well concealed, prohibi
a field of fire for air action. Howcver, on occasion. I
'tracks while with the infantry have engaged aerial tar.
with good cffccts. For this rcason, they should never
permitted to forget they are AA troops with AA wea
9. AA troops with the infantry should be utilized in
battalion
planes.
AAAIS net and should givc warning of en
10. \Vhcn the
cxpected to return
mission is such that the cnemv mar
fire with artillery or mortars, be' prep
beforchand to move out immediatcly after firing. In
connection, don't pick a firing position in close proxi
to friendly troops or they will unwittingly receive
return fire.
II. On some occasions defensive missions such as
ning roadblocks or filling a gap in the line have been
sumed. Little firing is expected on such missions unlessJ
enemy counterattack develops. However, extreme care
to camouflage, concealment, and the proper behavior of
troops in such a situation cannot be overstressed.
12. Other pointers for tactical operations: a. Back '
firing positions you want to leave quickly. b. Have a
on the round in front of the turret to kee 37mm h