January-February - Air Defense Artillery

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marines to ci\'ilian life. The existence of different point
systems, of different methods for operating separation procedures
at different installations and the uncorrelated demands
upon the nation's transportation system are today
an indication of the disadvantages which arise when two
different and independent oroanizations are carrvino on
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demobilization simultaneouslv.
ORGAl''lZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS-CoMBINED TRAINING
Prior to \Vorld \\Tar II there was little teamwork between
the Army and Navy insofar as actual preparations for combined
operations were concerned, although all the Am1Y's
war plans called for landinos on foreion shores. Not until
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war arrived was there any appreciable joint training in amphibious
operations.
The value of thorough training in combined operations
was demonstrated forcefully in the Normandy landinos
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where there was the closest cooperation. Training for this
gigantic assault was organized and carried on in England
during the months of preparation after the war began. A
future war may not giye our armed forces time for such
transitional training and joint preparation. Certainly the
nation should not count on any such period but should provide
a system whereby adequate combined training can be
perfected during the years of peace.
The \\Tar Department believes that a single department
can best produce and administer an integrated training program,
conduct joint training activities, and permit officers
to be assigned in such a way that an individual officer will
have an understanding of other Services besides the one in
which he has specialized. It is a safe assumption that without
unified direction-and specific appropriations to make combined
training possible-each service will revert to its former
practice of concentrating on the training and development of
specialists in its own type of warfare. Thus joint training
and operations would assume a minor role in the postwar
military establishment, and there would be danger that the
nation would repeat the mistake of training separate units to
be committed to combat as a hastily organized team.
ORGANIZATION OF THE THREE MAJOR COl\IPONENTS
The unification plan establishes the three components,
Army, Navy and Air, as coequal members of a .single department.
Each would be headed by a commander who
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOllRNAL Jmlllar)'-Fe
would be responsible for the internal organization and
duct of his service, and for the organization, develop
and training of the military elements under his directi
1. The Air Force should include all land-based co
aircraft except those allotted to the Arm)' and ,
for reconnaissance. spotting of gunfire, command
messenger service. The Air would retain its own
cialized service forces.
2. The Army should include all combat ground I'
other than the 1\ larioe Corps and would ha\'e its
specialized service forces.
3. The Naw should include the United States Fleet
its air an;), the 1\ larine Corps. and its own special
service forces.
Eflicient conduct of operations requires that each
ponent retain its own specialized service forces. This m
for example, that the Navy would construct its own
and would supply and evacuate its own combat perso
The Arm)' would maintain its own repair facilities in
field for tanks, trucks and like equipment. The Air F
would have a complement of ground crews for mainten
repair and service of planes. There will always be a nee
such special service forces, particularly with the co
echelons of the three major components. However. as
single department accumulated experience, many com
services and functions could oraduallv be shifted to th
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rector of Common Supply. Such consolidations would e
substantial savings in money and could be accompli
without interfering with the efficient development of f
tions that should rightly be retained by the individual
ponents.
\Vith regard to overseas theater and area commanders
\Var Department believes that the system of unity of
mand which assured the coordination of the efforts of I
sea and air forces in the field should be continued. Th
commanders who served in the past war were named b)
President on the recommendations of the Joint Chie
Staff. They operated under directives prepared by the
Chiefs and approved by the President. The \Var De
ment feels that there always should be one top comma
in each theater and that this commander should owe his
allegiance directly to the President rather than to any
component of the armed forces.
Anything that is wrong with equipment should be
remedied as quickly as possible. The longer you let a
defect go-even though it may be a very minor one-the
worse the damage it will do, and the harder it will be
to fix it in the end.